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@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ EVOLUTION<br>
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<span style="font-size:0.75em">OF TRUST</span>
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</p>
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<p id="subtitle">
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playing time: 30 min • by nicky case, july 2017
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playing time: 20 min • by nicky case, july 2017
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</p>
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<p id="loading">
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@ -22,32 +22,30 @@ PLAY →
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<!-- - - - - - INTRO! - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TODO: Focus ONLY on social trust, not governments -->
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<!-- TODO: Also, strong early humor. -->
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<!-- TODO: "You guys, it's time for some game theory". -->
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<!-- TODO: "live and let live". -->
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<!-- TODO: it's sometimes RATIONAL to distrust: loop of trust & trustworthiness. -->
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<!-- TODO: mention "game theory" early again... -->
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<p id="intro">
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During World War I, peace broke out.
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<br><br>
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It was Christmas 1914 on the Western Front.<br>
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Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chill out with the enemy, British<br>
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Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chillax with the enemy, British<br>
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and German soldiers left their trenches, crossed No Man's Land,<br>
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and gathered together to bury their dead, to exchange gifts, to sing.
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and gathered to bury their dead, exchange gifts, and play games.
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<br><br>
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Meanwhile: it's 2017, the West has been at peace for decades, and<br>
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we're less trusting than ever. Fewer and fewer people say they trust their<br>
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governments, their media, or even <i>each other</i>. So here's our puzzle:
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by golly, we <i>suck</i> at trust. Over the years,
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fewer and fewer people say they trust their
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institutions, or even <i>each other</i>. So here's our puzzle:
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<br><br>
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<b>Why & when do friends become enemies?<br>
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or: Why & when do enemies become friends?</b>
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<b>Why, even in peacetime, do friends become enemies?<br>
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And why, even in wartime, do enemies become friends?</b>
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<br><br>
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I think game theory can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br>
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I think <b>game theory</b> can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br>
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and how we can fix it! So, to understand all this...
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</p>
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<p id="intro_button">
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@ -120,7 +118,7 @@ Wow, that's mean... and also the correct answer!
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_cooperated">
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Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <i>OR IS IT??</i>
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Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <b>OR IS IT??</b>
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_top">
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@ -130,30 +128,30 @@ But if you cheat & they cooperate, you gain three coins at their cost of one
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_btm">
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And <i>that's</i> the dilemma of trust.
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You'd both be better off trusting each other, but trust leaves you vulnerable.
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But what happens if we can...
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And <i>that's</i> our dilemma.
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Trust is nice, but it can let others take advantage of you -- or shoot you as you come unarmed out of a trench.
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Sometimes, distrust <i>is</i> rational!
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But now, what happens if we play this game...
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_button_next">
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...play more than once? →
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...more than once? →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - ITERATED - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TO DO: WEAVE IN MORE ABOUT TRENCHES. "CHOOSE WISELY" -->
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<p id="iterated_intro_top">
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<b>Now, let's play for real.</b><br>
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You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own "personality".
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<b>Now, let's play for real.</b>
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You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own game "strategy".
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With each opponent, you'll play anywhere between 3 to 7 rounds.
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(You won't know in advance when the last round is)
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Can you trust them? Or rather... can they trust <i>you?</i>
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_intro_btm">
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Choose your first, <b>real</b> move:
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Pick your first, <i>real</i> move. <b>Choose wisely.</b>
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_info_1">
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@ -240,8 +238,8 @@ Each character will now play against every other character:
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that's 10 paired matches, and 10 rounds per match.
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<br><br>
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Who do you think will get the highest <i>total</i> score?
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Think carefully about it, and then<br>
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<b>PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
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<b>Think carefully about it... and then
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PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_intro">
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@ -268,34 +266,41 @@ next match →
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_1">
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Oh, by the way...
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_2">
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Oh, by the way...
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...You may be skeptical about that Christmas Truce story about the World War I trenches.
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Surely that was just a fluke?
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_3">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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Yes, the truce was dramatic, but it was <i>neither unique, nor unusual</i>.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_4">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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Not <i>every</i> trench joined in the peace, but it was pretty widespread.
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Many front-lines came up with the idea independently, and again: <i>despite</i> strict orders.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_5">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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And in fact, even <i>before</i> Christmas, several front-lines already <i>had</i>
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established an unofficial, secret peace.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_6">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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They called it: <b>the "live and let live" system.</b>
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Basically, you don't shoot me, I don't shoot you. And this worked, in a lot of places!
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_7">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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You may still be skeptical. Most soldiers don't spontaneously form peace with the enemy.
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What's so special about <i>trench</i> warfare?
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_8">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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Well, here's what's unique about the trenches:
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unlike almost every other form of war,
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you have to face the same <i>specific soliders</i> every day.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_9">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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<b>It's a repeated game.</b> And that makes <i>all</i> the difference.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_10">
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Anyway -- and the winner is...
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Anyway. And the winner is...
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</p>
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<p id="the_winner_is">
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@ -309,7 +314,7 @@ Anyway -- and the winner is...
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Congrats, you placed your bet on the right horse.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_2_nay">
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(Sorry, [CHAR].)
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(Apologies to your bet, [CHAR].)
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_3">
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<span class="tft">Copycat</span> goes by many names.
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@ -399,7 +404,7 @@ and their numbers increased by 5.
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</p>
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<p id="evo_3_tft">
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Alas, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> did not win – but at least they didn't do as bad
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as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>, who got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>,
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as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>. They got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>,
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whose numbers have now increased by 5.
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</p>
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<p id="evo_3">
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@ -424,7 +429,6 @@ who <i>are</i> nice, but not naive.
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</p>
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<!-- TODO: Freeman-Dyson???? -->
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<!-- TODO: (other strategies will be introduced later) -->
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<p id="evo_7">
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By simply copying the other player's moves,
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@ -478,9 +482,6 @@ start the evolution process!
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stop the evolution process
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</p>
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<!-- More reference to game theory earlier? -->
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<!-- TODO: More "me" and "I"??? -->
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<p id="evo_10_followup">
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(Note: occasionally, a few <span class="grudge">Grudgers</span> may stick around,
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because when all players except <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="tft">Copycat</span>
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@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ However...
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</p>
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<p id="evo_11">
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Look around. There are jerks in the world.
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Look around. The world's full of total jerkwads.
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<br><br>
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If <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is the strategy in this repeated game of trust that's so powerful --
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that even soldiers in World War I trenches independently "evolved" a similar strategy, called "live and let live" --
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@ -544,7 +545,7 @@ once you're done playing around, click:
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_3">
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As you saw, when people play below some number of rounds,
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As you saw, if you don't play enough rounds, (here: 5 or less)
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<span class="all_d">ALWAYS CHEAT</span> dominates.
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<br><br>
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In 1985, when Americans were asked how many close friends they had,
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@ -581,31 +582,21 @@ once you're done, click:
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_5">
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The same thing happens: <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> dominates.
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So even if the reward for getting a "win-win" is still <i>more</i>
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than the punishment for a "lose-lose"...
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<b>if the reward for mutual trust is <i>too</i> low, distrust evolves.</b>
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The same thing happens:
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with a lower "win-win" reward, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> takes over.
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Game theory has two powerful ideas about this:
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<br><br>
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I think, as a culture, we're losing the value of finding "win-wins".
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We're more interested in "win-lose", because viciousness gets views, conflict gets clicks.
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It's live and let <i>die.</i>
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Maybe I'm just overthinking things, maybe I'm just old and shaking my fist at a cloud...
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but don't you feel it? That we've forgotten something?...
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<b>"Zero-sum game".</b> This is the sadly common belief that a gain for "us"
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<i>must</i> come at a loss to "them", and vice versa.
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<br><br>
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<b>"Non-zero-sum game".</b> This when people realize that by working together,
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you can create a win-win! (or at least, avoid a lose-lose)
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Without the non-zero-sum game, <i>trust cannot evolve.</i>
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<br><br>
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Speaking of which,
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let's now look at our third & final barrier to the evolution of trust...
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_5_btn">
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...whatevs i dunno →
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_6">
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Aaaaanyway, now you can change <i>both</i> rules!
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(click <b>start</b> to see how, with weird payoffs, the sim
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"swings" between <span class="all_d">Cheats</span> & <span class="all_c">Cooperates</span>...)
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_6_end">
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Once you're done experimenting with this,
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let's look at our final barrier to trust...
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</p>
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<p id="distrust_6_btn">
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<s>Misteaks</s> Mistakes. →
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</p>
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@ -615,7 +606,7 @@ let's look at our final barrier to trust...
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<p id="noise_1">
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As cool as <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is, it has a huge, fatal weakness I haven't mentioned yet.
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To understand it, let's say two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other:
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To understand the problem, let's say two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other:
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</p>
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<p id="noise_1_end">
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Being "nice" players, both their first moves will be:
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@ -638,7 +629,7 @@ But if the other person doesn't <i>think</i> it was an accident...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_4">
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<b>OH NO AGAIN</b>
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<b>OH NO TIMES TWO</b>
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<br>
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The other player, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, <i>had</i> to retaliate...
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</p>
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@ -659,7 +650,7 @@ Tragic. But now, are there <i>other</i> types of players who can...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_characters">
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Let's meet some new faces!
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Let's meet some new faces! (or, new hats, anyway)
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</p>
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<p id="character_tf2t">
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@ -689,38 +680,104 @@ Alright, let's see how well these peeps do when they...
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...play in a tournament →
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</p>
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<!-- fixed 5% chance: winner simpleton, then copykitten -->
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<!-- Need to simulate first to write words, i dunno -->
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<p id="noise_evo_1">
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Noise Evolution, place your bets.
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At <b>5% noise</b>
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Let's start with a dozen
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<span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span>,
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versus our old winner, the fair <span class="tft">Copycat</span>,
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and our three new characters:
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the forgiving <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span>,
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the dull <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span>, and
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the silly <span class="random">Random</span>.
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<br><br>
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Let's say, in each round of a match, players have a 5% chance of making a mistake.
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Who do you think will come out on top?
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<b>Think carefully, then PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_2">
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Try it, controls to the left
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Alright, you bet [CHAR] wins. Let's find out!
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Use the controls to your left to <b>start</b> the sim in quick mode,
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or go through it <b>step-by-step</b>.
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_2_2_correct">
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You were correct --
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_2_2_incorrect">
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Your bet was close, but no cigar --
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_2_2">
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Simpleton wins, but let's try...
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<span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> wins!
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This is because <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> is actually capable of
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exploiting <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>. They both start cooperating,
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but if <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> makes a mistake and cheats,
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since <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> never retaliates,
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<i>it'll keep cheating them</i>.
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_2_2_btn">
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Now let's try...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_3">
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...different scenario, place your bets again.
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...the same thing as before, except instead of half-<span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>,
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it's half-<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>. It's a much <i>less</i> forgiving,
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<i>more</i> hostile environment.
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<br><br>
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Who do you think will win now? <b>Think, then PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_4">
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Try it, controls to the left, again
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You bet on [CHAR]. Again, go through the simulation...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_4_2_correct">
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You were right on the money --
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_4_2_incorrect">
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Good guess, but someone else took the prize --
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_4_2">
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Ooh, surprising... but is that true if there's a LOT of noise?
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<span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins this time!
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That's surprising that with an even <i>meaner</i> starting population,
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<span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span>,
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a <i>more forgiving</i> version of <span class="tft">Copycat</span>,
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was the most successful! (note: <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> is so forgiving
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it doesn't even <i>entirely</i> wipe out <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. it shares room)
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<br><br>
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In this case, a bit of "miscommunication" (5% chance of mistake each round) could lead
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to more <i>forgiveness</i>. But is this true for <i>all</i> levels...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_4_2_btn">
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...of miscommunication?
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_5">
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GIVE A SLIDER FOR NOISE.
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<b>Use the slider below to change the amount of "miscommunication", then hit START.</b>
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At 5%, <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins.
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What happens at 0%? Or 20%? Or 50%? (it only goes up to 50%,
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because at that point, <i>every</i> move is a coin flip)
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_6">
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Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox.
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<p id="noise_evo_5_continue">
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When you're done playing around, click:
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_6_continue">
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Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox.
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<p id="noise_evo_6">
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The results turn out something like this:<br>
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<b>At 0%,</b> the fair <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins!
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<b>At 1% to 10%,</b> the forgiving <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins!
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<b>At 10% to 49%:</b> the unfair, unforgiving <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> wins.
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<b>At 50%,</b> <i>nobody wins ever.</i>
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<br><br>
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This is why "miscommunication" is such an interesting barrier to trust:
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a <i>little</i> bit of it leads to forgiveness,
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but <i>too much</i> and it leads to widespread distrust!
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I think our modern media technology,
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as much as it's helped us <i>increase</i> communication...
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has increased our <i>miscommunication</i> much more.
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<br><br>
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At last, let's experiment with <i>all</i> the numbers, the knobs and sliders.
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Let's play...
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</p>
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<p id="noise_evo_6_btn">
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Teaser for sandbox
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...in the Sandbox Mode!
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</p>
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@ -767,7 +824,7 @@ During each round, there's a [N]% chance a player makes a mistake:
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...and once you're done playing around, let's recap:
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</p>
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<p id="sandbox_end_btn">
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what we learnt today →
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what we learnt today! →
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</p>
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@ -776,46 +833,73 @@ what we learnt today →
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<!-- - - - - CONCLUSION! - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="conclusion_1">
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TRUST:
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- repeated interaction:
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- win-win:
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- dealing with mistakes: forgive, and try to be clear and honest yourself
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<p id="conclusion_0">
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Game theory has shown us the three things we need for the evolution of trust:
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_1_a">
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1. REPEAT INTERACTIONS
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_1_a2">
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Trust keeps a relationship going,
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but you need the knowledge of possible future repeat interactions <i>before</i> trust can evolve.
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_2_a">
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2. POSSIBLE WIN-WINS
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_2_a2">
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You must be playing a non-zero-sum game,
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a game where it's at least possible that <i>both</i> players can be better off -- a win-win.
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_3_a">
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3. LOW MISCOMMUNICATION
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_3_a2">
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The level of miscommunication can't be <i>too</i> high.
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And when there's a little bit of miscommunication, it pays to be <i>more</i> forgiving.
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_4">
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Of course, real-world trust is affected by a lot more than this.
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there's reputation, moral values, contracts, cultural markers, etc, etc.
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And let's not forget...
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_btn">
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...the <i>biggest</i> lesson. →
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</p>
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DISTRUST:
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- loss of social capital
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- win-lose, use versus them, zero-sum
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- gleefully punishing even small mistakes
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<p id="outro_1">
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|
If there's one big takeaway<br>
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from <i>all</i> of game theory, it's this:
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<br><br>
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|
<b>What the game is, defines what the players do.</b><br>
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|
Our problem today isn't just that people are losing trust,<br>
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|
it's that our <i>environment</i> acts against the evolution of trust.
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<br><br>
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That may seem cynical or naive -- that we're "merely" products of our environment --
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but as game theory reminds us, we <i>are</i> each others' environment.
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<b>In the short run, the game defines the players. But in the long run,
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it's us players who define the game.</b>
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<br><br>
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|
So, do what <i>you</i> can to create the conditions necessary to evolve trust.
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|
Build relationships. Find win-wins. Communicate clearly.
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|
Maybe then, we can stop firing at each other, get out of our own trenches,
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cross No Man's Land to come together...
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</p>
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But above all, there's also...
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<p id="outro_1_btn">
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and all learn...
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_btn">
|
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...the bigger lesson →
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_2">
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Don't hate the player, hate the game.
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<br>
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Game theory lesson.
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<br>
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Short term: game changes players. But don't be cynical
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<br>
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Long term: players change game, from the bottom up -- evolution.
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<br>
|
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|
So if we wanna cure our epidemic of distrust,
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and rebuild a trusting & trustworthy civic society, it's up to all of <i>us.</i>
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Let's all learn and act to find win-wins,
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to create repeated interactions,
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(and...)
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_2">
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<p id="outro_2">
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...to live and let live.
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<!-- the christmas truce pic/photo(?) circular pic... words overlaid -->
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</p>
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<p id="conclusion_button">
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<p id="outro_2_credits">
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|
|
"A Christmas Truce between Opposing Trenches"
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|
Illustrated by AC Michael.
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|
Published in <i>The Illustrated London News</i>, January 9, 1915.
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</p>
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<p id="outro_2_btn">
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<3
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</p>
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@ -823,6 +907,25 @@ to create repeated interactions,
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|
<!-- - - - - - CREDITS! - - - - - - -->
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|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="credits_beta">
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|
<b>END OF BETA!</b> Please let me know what you think!
|
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|
|
|
Because I'm launching this in a few days, I'm looking first and foremost
|
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|
|
for low-level feedback:
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|
|
Specific parts which are unclear, confusing, or boring.
|
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|
Bad or problematic phrasing of words.
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|
Typos and grammatical errors.
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|
Opportunities to add more jokes.
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And so on.
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<br><br>
|
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|
But if you have "high-level" feedback, I'd love to hear that too!
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|
I won't be able to put them in this time, but for my next project(s),
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I want to know how I can design stuff like this better.
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<br><br>
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|
Thank you so much!
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<br><br>
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|
<3,<br>
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|
|
~ Nicky Case
|
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
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|
<!-- - - - - FEETNOTES - - - - - - -->
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Nicky Case
7 years ago
