<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - TITLE! - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="title"> <span style="font-size:0.75em">THE</span><br> EVOLUTION<br> <span style="font-size:0.75em">OF TRUST</span> </p> <p id="subtitle"> playing time: 30 min • by nicky case, july 2017 </p> <p id="loading"> loading... </p> <p id="loading_done"> PLAY → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - INTRO! - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- TODO: Focus ONLY on social trust, not governments --> <!-- TODO: Also, strong early humor. --> <!-- TODO: "You guys, it's time for some game theory". --> <!-- TODO: "live and let live". --> <!-- TODO: it's sometimes RATIONAL to distrust: loop of trust & trustworthiness. --> <p id="intro"> During World War I, peace broke out. <br><br> It was Christmas 1914 on the Western Front.<br> Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chill out with the enemy, British<br> and German soldiers left their trenches, crossed No Man's Land,<br> and gathered together to bury their dead, to exchange gifts, to sing. <br><br> Meanwhile: it's 2017, the West has been at peace for decades, and<br> we're less trusting than ever. Fewer and fewer people say they trust their<br> governments, their media, or even <i>each other</i>. So here's our puzzle: <br><br> <b>Why & when do friends become enemies?<br> or: Why & when do enemies become friends?</b> <br><br> I think game theory can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br> and how we can fix it! So, to understand all this... </p> <p id="intro_button"> ...let's play a game. → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - ONE OFF! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_you_cooperate"> you<br>cooperate </p> <p id="label_you_cheat"> you<br>cheat </p> <p id="label_they_cooperate"> they<br>cooperate </p> <p id="label_they_cheat"> they<br>cheat </p> <p id="label_you"> you<br>↙ </p> <p id="label_them"> other player<br>↘ </p> <p id="oneoff_0_top"> <b>THE GAME OF TRUST</b> <br> You have one choice. In front of you is a machine: if you put a coin in the machine, the <i>other player</i> gets three coins – and vice versa. You both can either choose to COOPERATE (put in coin), or CHEAT (don't put in coin). </p> <p id="oneoff_0_btm"> Let's say the other player cheats, and doesn't put in a coin.<br> What should you do? </p> <p id="oneoff_1_cheated"> Exactly! Why let that moocher mooch off of you? </p> <p id="oneoff_1_cooperated"> Alas, turning the other cheek just gets you slapped! </p> <p id="oneoff_1_top"> If you cooperate & they cheat, you lose a coin while they gain three. (score: -1 vs +3) However, if you both cheat, neither of you gain or lose anything. (score: 0 vs 0) <b>Therefore: you should CHEAT.</b> </p> <p id="oneoff_1_btm"> But let's say the other player cooperates, and puts in a coin.<br> What should you do now? </p> <p id="oneoff_2_cheated"> Wow, that's mean... and also the correct answer! </p> <p id="oneoff_2_cooperated"> Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <i>OR IS IT??</i> </p> <p id="oneoff_2_top"> Because if you both cooperate, you both give up a coin to gain three. (score: +2 vs +2) But if you cheat & they cooperate, you gain three coins at their cost of one. (score: +3 vs -1) <b>Therefore: you "should" still CHEAT.</b> </p> <p id="oneoff_2_btm"> And <i>that's</i> the dilemma of trust. You'd both be better off trusting each other, but trust leaves you vulnerable. But what happens if we can... </p> <p id="oneoff_button_next"> ...play more than once? → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - ITERATED - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- TO DO: WEAVE IN MORE ABOUT TRENCHES. "CHOOSE WISELY" --> <p id="iterated_intro_top"> <b>Now, let's play for real.</b><br> You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own "personality". With each opponent, you'll play anywhere between 3 to 7 rounds. Can you trust them? Or rather... can they trust <i>you?</i> </p> <p id="iterated_intro_btm"> Choose your first, <b>real</b> move: </p> <p id="iterated_info_1"> opponent: [X] of [Y] </p> </p> <p id="iterated_info_2"> your total score: </p> <p id="iterated_score_start"> And your total score is... </p> <p id="iterated_score_1"> which is, wow, actually <i>impressively</i> bad. </p> <p id="iterated_score_2"> which, uh, could be worse! </p> <p id="iterated_score_3"> which ain't bad! </p> <p id="iterated_score_4"> which is pretty good! </p> <p id="iterated_score_5"> which is <i>perfect!</i> Congrats you have too much time on your hands. </p> <p id="iterated_score_x"> ...i have no idea how you did that. </p> <p id="iterated_score_end"> (the lowest & highest possible scores are 8 and 49, respectively) </p> <p id="who_were"> So who were these strange characters you just played against? </p> <p id="character_tft"> <b>COPYCAT:</b> Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow </p> <p id="character_all_d"> <b>ALWAYS CHEAT:</b> <i>the strong shall eat the weak</i> </p> <p id="character_all_c"> <b>ALWAYS COOPERATE:</b> Let's be best friends! <3 </p> <p id="character_grudge"> <b>GRUDGER:</b> Listen, pardner. I'll start cooperatin', and keep cooperation', but if y'all ever cheat me, I'LL CHEAT YOU BACK 'TIL THE END OF TARNATION. </p> <p id="character_prober"> <b>DETECTIVE:</b> First: I analyze you. I start: Cooperate, Cheat, Cooperate, Cooperate. If you cheat back, I'll act like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. If you never cheat back, I'll act like <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, to exploit you. Elementary, my dear Watson. </p> <p id="characters_teaser"> Now, what if these characters were to play... </p> <p id="characters_button"> ...against each other? → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - TOURNAMENT! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="place_your_bets"> It's tournament time! Each character will now play against every other character: that's 10 paired matches, and 10 rounds per match. <br><br> Who do you think will get the highest <i>total</i> score? Think carefully about it, and then<br> <b>PLACE YOUR BETS:</b> </p> <p id="tournament_intro"> Alright, you placed your bet on [CHAR]! Let's go through the matches one by one, and see how the tournament plays out... </p> <p id="first_match"> first match → </p> <p id="next_match"> next match → </p> <p id="match_header_1"> <b>Match #[N]:</b> [A] vs [B] </p> <p id="match_header_2"> <b>Rounds:</b> </p> <p id="match_header_3"> <b>Total Scores:</b> [A] vs [B] </p> <p id="tournament_1"> </p> <p id="tournament_2"> Oh, by the way... </p> <p id="tournament_3"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_4"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_5"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_6"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_7"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_8"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_9"> [trench live & let live stuff] </p> <p id="tournament_10"> Anyway -- and the winner is... </p> <p id="the_winner_is"> (drumroll please...) → </p> <p id="tournament_winner_1"> <b class="tft">COPYCAT!</b> </p> <p id="tournament_winner_2_yay"> Congrats, you placed your bet on the right horse. </p> <p id="tournament_winner_2_nay"> (Sorry, [CHAR].) </p> <p id="tournament_winner_3"> <span class="tft">Copycat</span> goes by many names. The Golden Rule, reciprocal altruism, tit for tat, or... <b>live and let live.</b> That's why "peace" could emerge in the trenches of World War I: when you're forced to play the same game with the same <i>specific people</i> (not just the same generic "enemy") over and over again -- <span class="tft">Copycat</span> doesn't just win the battle, it wins the war. <br><br> But if things change a lot when you play multiple rounds of the same game, what if we play... </p> <p id="tournament_teaser"> ...multiple <i>tournaments?</i> → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - EVOLUTION! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="evolution_intro"> Now, let's let our population of players <i>evolve over time</i>. It's a 3-step dance: </p> <p id="evolution_intro_1"> <b>1. PLAY A TOURNAMENT</b><br> Let them all play against each other, and tally up their scores. </p> <p id="evolution_intro_2"> <b>2. ELIMINATE LOSERS</b><br> Get rid of the 5 worst players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them) </p> <p id="evolution_intro_3"> <b>3. REPRODUCE WINNERS</b><br> Clone the 5 best players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them) </p> <p id="evolution_intro_footer"> ...and REPEAT, for as long as you'd like. Note: you don't have to wait for people to literally die & reproduce for culture to evolve -- all that's needed is that "unsuccessful" behaviors go away, and "successful" behaviors are imitated. So now... </p> <p id="evolution_intro_button"> ...let's see this in action. → </p> <p id="evo_1"> Say we start with the following population of players: <span class="all_c">15 Always Cooperates</span>, <span class="all_d">5 Always Cheats</span>, and <span class="tft">5 Copycats</span>. (We'll ignore <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> for now) <br><br> We're going to do the tournament-eliminate-reproduce dance a dozen times or so. Let's make another bet! Who do you think will win the <i>first</i> tournament? </p> <p id="evo_2_all_c"> Makes sense, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> outnumbers everyone else right now... </p> <p id="evo_2_all_d"> Makes sense, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> has a lot of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> to exploit... </p> <p id="evo_2_tft"> Makes sense, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> won the tournament last time, why not again?... </p> <p id="evo_2"> Let's see if you're correct: </p> <p id="label_play_tournament"> 1) play tournament </p> <p id="label_eliminate_bottom_5"> 2) eliminate bottom 5 </p> <p id="label_reproduce_top_5"> 3) reproduce top 5 </p> <p id="evo_3_all_c"> Alas, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3_all_d"> Sadly, you were correct! The <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> won this time, and their numbers increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3_tft"> Alas, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> did not win – but at least they didn't do as bad as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>, who got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3"> But let's try a few more rounds of this... </p> <p id="evo_4"> <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> is still growing, at the expense of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>... </p> <p id="evo_5"> And now, all the <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> are dead. But, wait... </p> <p id="evo_6"> That's right: the <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> became a victim of their own success! They exploited the naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span>, but once they ran out of them, they had to face the <span class="tft">Copycats</span>: who <i>are</i> nice, but not naive. </p> <!-- TODO: Freeman-Dyson???? --> <!-- TODO: (other strategies will be introduced later) --> <p id="evo_7"> By simply copying the other player's moves, <span class="tft">Copycats</span> can play nice with each other, while <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> just cheat themselves! Not only that, but it also means <span class="tft">Copycat</span> can give <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> a taste of their own medicine. </p> <p id="evo_8"> And so, as a result... </p> <p id="evo_9"> ...<span class="tft">Copycat</span> inherits the earth. </p> <p id="evo_9_all_c"> So, although your bet was off -- the nice-but-naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span> were doomed from the start -- in the end, a <i>smart</i> form of niceness prevailed, and the <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> were squashed. </p> <p id="evo_9_all_d"> So, in the short run you were right - <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> won the first few rounds, but in the end, its exploitativeness was its downfall. </p> <p id="evo_9_tft"> So, in the long run, you were right - <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins! <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> may have won in the short run, but its exploitativeness was its downfall. </p> <p id="evo_9_end"> This reminds me of a quote: <br><br> <i>"We are punished by our sins, not for them."</i><br> ~ Elbert Hubbard </p> <p id="evo_9_btn"> (oh, and by the way...) </p> <p id="evo_10"> (...this result is similar even if we put <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> back in:) </p> <p id="evo_autoplay"> start the evolution process! </p> <p id="evo_autoplay_stop"> stop the evolution process </p> <!-- More reference to game theory earlier? --> <!-- TODO: More "me" and "I"??? --> <p id="evo_10_followup"> (Note: occasionally, a few <span class="grudge">Grudgers</span> may stick around, because when all players except <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="tft">Copycat</span> are eliminated, the two tie.) <br><br> So, it seems the math of game theory is telling us something: that <span class="tft">Copycat's</span> philosophy, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you", may be not just a <i>moral</i> truth, but also a <i>mathematical</i> truth. However... </p> <p id="evo_10_btn"> ...there's a problem: → </p> <p id="evo_11"> Look around. There are jerks in the world. <br><br> If <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is the strategy in this repeated game of trust that's so powerful -- that even soldiers in World War I trenches independently "evolved" a similar strategy, called "live and let live" -- why, then, are there so many un-trusting, un-trustworthy people? What's causing our epidemic of un-trust? <br><br> A clue's in that sentence itself. "In <i>this</i> repeated game of trust." So far we've only talked about change in the players: what about <i>a change in the game?</i> What could lead to... </p> <p id="evo_11_btn"> ...the evolution of <i>distrust?</i> </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - DISTRUST - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="distrust_1"> Before everything goes to heck, let's start with something nice! Here's a world filled entirely with <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span>, except for one <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> and one <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. <br><br> Use the buttons on the right to <b>start</b> the sim, go through it <b>step-by-step</b>, or <b>reset</b> it. → </p> <p id="distrust_2"> As you already know, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins handily in the long run, under our current rules! <br><br> But that's under our <i>current</i> rules, which say that players play against each other for <i>10</i> rounds per match. Does <span class="tft">Copycat</span> still win at 7 rounds? 5 rounds? 3? 2? 1? <br><br> <b>Change the number of rounds</b> with the slider below, <b>start</b> the sim, and see what happens. Feel free to experiment as much as you'd like! </p> <p id="distrust_2_end"> once you're done playing around, click: </p> <p id="distrust_3"> As you saw, when people play below some number of rounds, <span class="all_d">ALWAYS CHEAT</span> dominates. <br><br> In 1985, when Americans were asked how many close friends they had, the most common answer was "three". In 2004, the most common answer was <i>"zero"</i>. We now have fewer friends across class, racial, economic, and political lines, because we have fewer friends -- <i>period.</i> And as you just discovered for yourself, <b>the fewer "repeat interactions" there are, the more distrust will spread.</b> <br><br> (no, mass media doesn't count: it must be <i>two-way</i> interactions between <i>specific individuals</i>.) </p> <p id="distrust_3_btn"> and oh, it gets worse... → </p> <p id="distrust_4"> There's <i>another</i> way to breed distrust. Here are the "payoffs" for the trust game: </p> <p id="distrust_4_2"> Let's start with a mostly-<span class="tft">Copycat</span> world. Normally, they'd win. But now, <b>change the "trust" reward from +2 to +1, then click start. →</b> Even though +1 is still <i>more</i> than the punishment for mutual distrust (0)... what happens? </p> <p id="distrust_4_note"> feel free to play around with different payoffs! once you're done, click: </p> <p id="distrust_4_note_2"> (simulating: 10 rounds per match) </p> <p id="distrust_5"> The same thing happens: <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> dominates. So even if the reward for getting a "win-win" is still <i>more</i> than the punishment for a "lose-lose"... <b>if the reward for mutual trust is <i>too</i> low, distrust evolves.</b> <br><br> I think, as a culture, we're losing the value of finding "win-wins". We're more interested in "win-lose", because viciousness gets views, conflict gets clicks. It's live and let <i>die.</i> Maybe I'm just overthinking things, maybe I'm just old and shaking my fist at a cloud... but don't you feel it? That we've forgotten something?... </p> <p id="distrust_5_btn"> ...whatevs i dunno → </p> <p id="distrust_6"> Aaaaanyway, now you can change <i>both</i> rules! (click <b>start</b> to see how, with weird payoffs, the sim "swings" between <span class="all_d">Cheats</span> & <span class="all_c">Cooperates</span>...) </p> <p id="distrust_6_end"> Once you're done experimenting with this, let's look at our final barrier to trust... </p> <p id="distrust_6_btn"> <s>Misteaks</s> Mistakes. → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - NOISE! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="noise_1"> As cool as <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is, it has a huge, fatal weakness I haven't mentioned yet. To understand it, let's say two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other: </p> <p id="noise_1_end"> Being "nice" players, both their first moves will be: </p> <p id="noise_2"> And normally, they'd just pay back each others' kindness and sing Kumbaya until the end of time. </p> <p id="noise_2_end"> But what if, while trying to reciprocate goodness... </p> <p id="noise_3"> <b>OH NO</b> <br> Mistakes, miscommunication, misinterpretations -- accidents happen all the time in real life. </p> <p id="noise_3_end"> But if the other person doesn't <i>think</i> it was an accident... </p> <p id="noise_4"> <b>OH NO AGAIN</b> <br> The other player, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, <i>had</i> to retaliate... </p> <p id="noise_4_end"> ...and you, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span> as well, will <i>also</i> have to retaliate... </p> <p id="noise_5"> Thus, like the Hatfields and McCoys, these two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> will spiral into an endless cycle of vengeance... that started over a single mistake, long ago. </p> <p id="noise_5_end"> Tragic. But now, are there <i>other</i> types of players who can... </p> <p id="noise_5_btn"> ...deal with mistakes? → </p> <p id="noise_characters"> Let's meet some new faces! </p> <p id="character_tf2t"> <b>COPYKITTEN:</b><br> Hello! I'm like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row. After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purrrrr </p> <p id="character_pavlov"> <b>SIMPLETON:</b><br> hi i try start cooperate. if you cooperate back, i do <i>same thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake. if you cheat back, i do <i>opposite thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake. </p> <p id="character_random"> <b>RANDOM:</b><br> <i>Monkey robot! Ninja pizza tacos! lol i'm so random</i><br> (Just plays Cheat or Cooperate randomly with a 50/50 chance) </p> <p id="noise_characters_end"> Alright, let's see how well these peeps do when they... </p> <p id="noise_characters_btn"> ...play in a tournament → </p> <!-- fixed 5% chance: winner simpleton, then copykitten --> <!-- Need to simulate first to write words, i dunno --> <p id="noise_evo_1"> Noise Evolution, place your bets. At <b>5% noise</b> </p> <p id="noise_evo_2"> Try it, controls to the left </p> <p id="noise_evo_2_2"> Simpleton wins, but let's try... </p> <p id="noise_evo_3"> ...different scenario, place your bets again. </p> <p id="noise_evo_4"> Try it, controls to the left, again </p> <p id="noise_evo_4_2"> Ooh, surprising... but is that true if there's a LOT of noise? </p> <p id="noise_evo_5"> GIVE A SLIDER FOR NOISE. </p> <p id="noise_evo_6"> Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox. </p> <p id="noise_evo_6_continue"> Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox. </p> <p id="noise_evo_6_btn"> Teaser for sandbox </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - SANDBOX! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="sandbox_population"> Start off with this distribution of players: </p> <p id="sandbox_payoffs"> The payoffs in a one-on-one game are: </p> <p id="sandbox_reset_payoffs"> set default </p> <!-- When translating the following, keep the "[N]", with square brackets, as a placeholder for the number. Some of these need double-translations, one for the plural version, one for the singular version. --> <p id="sandbox_rules_1"> Play [N] rounds per match: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_1_single"> Play [N] round per match: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_2"> After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] players & reproduce the top [N] players: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_2_single"> After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] player & reproduce the top [N] player: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_3"> During each round, there's a [N]% chance a player makes a mistake: </p> <p id="sandbox_end"> ...and once you're done playing around, let's recap: </p> <p id="sandbox_end_btn"> what we learnt today → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - CONCLUSION! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="conclusion_1"> TRUST: - repeated interaction: - win-win: - dealing with mistakes: forgive, and try to be clear and honest yourself DISTRUST: - loss of social capital - win-lose, use versus them, zero-sum - gleefully punishing even small mistakes But above all, there's also... </p> <p id="conclusion_btn"> ...the bigger lesson → </p> <p id="conclusion_2"> Don't hate the player, hate the game. <br> Game theory lesson. <br> Short term: game changes players. But don't be cynical <br> Long term: players change game, from the bottom up -- evolution. <br> So if we wanna cure our epidemic of distrust, and rebuild a trusting & trustworthy civic society, it's up to all of <i>us.</i> Let's all learn and act to find win-wins, to create repeated interactions, (and...) </p> <p id="conclusion_2"> ...to live and let live. <!-- the christmas truce pic/photo(?) circular pic... words overlaid --> </p> <p id="conclusion_button"> <3 </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - CREDITS! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - FEETNOTES - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - THE PLAYERS - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_tft">Copycat</p> <p id="label_short_tft"> copycat </p> <p id="icon_tft"> <span class="tft"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Copycat</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_all_d">Always Cheat</p> <p id="label_short_all_d"> cheater </p> <p id="icon_all_d"> <span class="all_d"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">All Cheat</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_all_c">Always Cooperate</p> <p id="label_short_all_c"> cooperater </p> <p id="icon_all_c"> <span class="all_c"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">All Cooperate</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_grudge">Grudger</p> <p id="label_short_grudge"> grudger </p> <p id="icon_grudge"> <span class="grudge"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Grudger</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_prober">Detective</p> <p id="label_short_prober"> detective </p> <p id="icon_prober"> <span class="prober"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Detective</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_tf2t">Copykitten</p> <p id="label_short_tf2t"> copykitten </p> <p id="icon_tf2t"> <span class="tf2t"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Copykitten</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_pavlov">Simpleton</p> <p id="label_short_pavlov"> simpleton </p> <p id="icon_pavlov"> <span class="pavlov"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Simpleton</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_random">Random</p> <p id="label_short_random"> random </p> <p id="icon_random"> <span class="random"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Random</span> </span> </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - SMALL LABELS! - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_cooperate"> cooperate </p> <p id="label_cheat"> cheat </p> <p id="label_play"> play </p> <p id="label_start"> start </p> <p id="label_stop"> stop </p> <p id="label_step"> step </p> <p id="label_reset"> reset </p> <p id="label_population"> population </p> <p id="label_payoffs"> payoffs </p> <p id="label_rules"> rules </p> <p id="label_next"> next → </p> <p id="label_continue"> continue </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - NAVIGATING CHAPTERS - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="chapter_intro"> 0. Introduction </p> <p id="chapter_oneoff"> 1. One Game </p> <p id="chapter_iterated"> 2. Repeated Game </p> <p id="chapter_tournament"> 3. One Tournament </p> <p id="chapter_evolution"> 4. Repeated Tournament </p> <p id="chapter_distrust"> 5. The Evolution of Distrust </p> <p id="chapter_noise"> 6. Making Mistaeks </p> <p id="chapter_sandbox"> 7. Sandbox Mode </p> <p id="chapter_conclusion"> 8. Conclusion </p> <p id="chapter_credits"> 9. Credits </p>