<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - META STUFF - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="meta_title"> The Evolution of Trust </p> <p id="meta_desc"> an interactive guide to the game theory of why & how we trust each other </p> <p id="meta_loading"> loading... </p> <p id="meta_on"> ON </p> <p id="meta_off"> OFF </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - TITLE! - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="title"> <span style="font-size:0.75em">THE</span><br> EVOLUTION<br> <span style="font-size:0.75em">OF TRUST</span> </p> <p id="subtitle"> playing time: 30 min • by nicky case, july 2017 </p> <p id="loading"> loading... </p> <p id="loading_done"> PLAY → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - INTRO! - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- TODO: Also, strong early humor. --> <!-- TODO: mention "game theory" early again... --> <p id="intro"> During World War I, peace broke out. <br><br> It was Christmas 1914 on the Western Front.<br> Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chillax with the enemy, British<br> and German soldiers left their trenches, crossed No Man's Land,<br> and gathered to bury their dead, exchange gifts, and play games. <br><br> Meanwhile: it's 2017, the West has been at peace for decades, and<br> wow, we <i>suck</i> at trust. Surveys show that, over the past forty years, fewer and fewer people say they trust each other. So here's our puzzle: <br><br> <b>Why, even in peacetime, do friends become enemies?<br> And why, even in wartime, do enemies become friends?</b> <br><br> I think <b>game theory</b> can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br> and how we can fix it! So, to understand all this... </p> <p id="intro_button"> ...let's play a game. → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - ONE OFF! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_you_cooperate"> you<br>cooperate </p> <p id="label_you_cheat"> you<br>cheat </p> <p id="label_they_cooperate"> they<br>cooperate </p> <p id="label_they_cheat"> they<br>cheat </p> <p id="label_you"> you<br>↙ </p> <p id="label_them"> other player<br>↘ </p> <p id="oneoff_0_top"> <b>THE GAME OF TRUST</b> <br> You have one choice. In front of you is a machine: if you put a coin in the machine, the <i>other player</i> gets three coins – and vice versa. You both can either choose to COOPERATE (put in coin), or CHEAT (don't put in coin). </p> <p id="oneoff_0_btm"> <b>Let's say the other player cheats, and doesn't put in a coin.</b><br> What should you do? </p> <p id="oneoff_1_cheated"> Exactly! Why let that moocher mooch off of you? </p> <p id="oneoff_1_cooperated"> Alas, turning the other cheek just gets you slapped! </p> <p id="oneoff_1_top"> If you cooperate & they cheat, you lose a coin while they gain three. (score: -1 vs +3) However, if you both cheat, neither of you gain or lose anything. (score: 0 vs 0) <b>Therefore: you should CHEAT.</b> </p> <p id="oneoff_1_btm"> <b>But let's say the other player cooperates, and puts in a coin.</b><br> What should you do now? </p> <p id="oneoff_2_cheated"> Wow, that's mean... and also the correct answer! </p> <p id="oneoff_2_cooperated"> Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <b>OR IS IT??</b> </p> <p id="oneoff_2_top"> Because if you both cooperate, you both give up a coin to gain three. (score: +2 vs +2) But if you cheat & they cooperate, you gain three coins at their cost of one. (score: +3 vs -1) <b>Therefore: you "should" still CHEAT.</b> </p> <p id="oneoff_2_btm"> And <i>that's</i> our dilemma. Trust is nice, but it can let others take advantage of you -- or shoot you as you come unarmed out of a trench. Sometimes, distrust <i>is</i> rational! But now, what happens if we play this game... </p> <p id="oneoff_button_next"> ...more than once? → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - ITERATED - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="iterated_intro_top"> <b>Now, let's play for real.</b> You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own game "strategy". With each opponent, you'll play anywhere between 3 to 7 rounds. (You won't know in advance when the last round is) Can you trust them? Or rather... can they trust <i>you?</i> </p> <p id="iterated_intro_btm"> Pick your first, <i>real</i> move. <b>Choose wisely.</b> </p> <p id="iterated_info_1"> opponent: [X] of [Y] </p> </p> <p id="iterated_info_2"> your total score: </p> <p id="iterated_score_start"> And your total score is... </p> <p id="iterated_score_1"> which is, wow, actually <i>impressively</i> bad. </p> <p id="iterated_score_2"> which, uh, could be worse! </p> <p id="iterated_score_3"> which ain't bad! </p> <p id="iterated_score_4"> which is pretty good! </p> <p id="iterated_score_5"> which is <i>perfect!</i> Congrats you have too much time on your hands. </p> <p id="iterated_score_x"> ...i have no idea how you did that. </p> <p id="iterated_score_end"> (the lowest & highest possible scores are 8 and 49, respectively) </p> <p id="who_were"> So who were these strange characters you just played against? </p> <p id="character_tft"> <b>COPYCAT:</b> Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow </p> <p id="character_all_d"> <b>ALWAYS CHEAT:</b> <i>the strong shall eat the weak</i> </p> <p id="character_all_c"> <b>ALWAYS COOPERATE:</b> Let's be best friends! <3 </p> <p id="character_grudge"> <b>GRUDGER:</b> Listen, pardner. I'll start cooperatin', and keep cooperation', but if y'all ever cheat me, I'LL CHEAT YOU BACK 'TIL THE END OF TARNATION. </p> <p id="character_prober"> <b>DETECTIVE:</b> First: I analyze you. I start: Cooperate, Cheat, Cooperate, Cooperate. If you cheat back, I'll act like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. If you never cheat back, I'll act like <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, to exploit you. Elementary, my dear Watson. </p> <p id="characters_teaser"> Now, what if these characters were to play... </p> <p id="characters_button"> ...against each other? → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - TOURNAMENT! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="place_your_bets"> It's tournament time! Each character will now play against every other character: that's 10 paired matches, and 10 rounds per match. <br><br> Who do you think will get the highest <i>total</i> score? <b>Think carefully about it... and then PLACE YOUR BETS:</b> </p> <p id="tournament_intro"> Alright, you placed your bet on [CHAR]! Let's go through the matches one by one, and see how the tournament plays out... </p> <p id="first_match"> first match → </p> <p id="next_match"> next match → </p> <p id="match_header_1"> <b>Match #[N]:</b> [A] vs [B] </p> <p id="match_header_2"> <b>Rounds:</b> </p> <p id="match_header_3"> <b>Total Scores:</b> [A] vs [B] </p> <p id="tournament_1"> Oh, by the way... </p> <p id="tournament_2"> ...You may be skeptical about that Christmas Truce story about the World War I trenches. Surely that was just a fluke? </p> <p id="tournament_3"> Yes, the truce was dramatic, but it was <i>neither unique, nor unusual</i>. </p> <p id="tournament_4"> Not <i>every</i> trench joined in the peace, but it was pretty widespread. Many front-lines came up with the idea independently, and again: <i>despite</i> specific, strict orders not to. </p> <p id="tournament_5"> And in fact, even <i>before</i> Christmas, several front-lines already <i>had</i> established an unofficial, secret peace. </p> <p id="tournament_6"> They called it: <b>the "live and let live" system.</b> Basically, you don't shoot me, I don't shoot you. And this worked, in a lot of places! </p> <p id="tournament_7"> You may still be skeptical. Most soldiers don't spontaneously form peace with the enemy. What's so special about <i>trench</i> warfare? </p> <p id="tournament_8"> Well, here's what's unique about the trenches: unlike almost every other form of war, you have to face the same <i>specific soldiers</i> every day. </p> <p id="tournament_9"> <b>It's a repeated game.</b> And that makes <i>all</i> the difference. </p> <p id="tournament_10"> Anyway. And the winner is... </p> <p id="the_winner_is"> (drumroll please...) → </p> <p id="tournament_winner_1"> <b class="tft">COPYCAT!</b> </p> <p id="tournament_winner_2_yay"> Congrats, you placed your bet on the right horse. </p> <p id="tournament_winner_2_nay"> (Apologies to your bet, [CHAR].) </p> <p id="tournament_winner_3"> <span class="tft">Copycat</span> goes by many names. The Golden Rule, reciprocal altruism, tit for tat, or... <b>live and let live.</b> That's why "peace" could emerge in the trenches of World War I: when you're forced to play the same game with the same <i>specific people</i> (not just the same generic "enemy") over and over again -- <span class="tft">Copycat</span> doesn't just win the battle, it wins the war. <br><br> But if things change a lot when you play multiple rounds of the same game, what if we play... </p> <p id="tournament_teaser"> ...multiple <i>tournaments?</i> → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - EVOLUTION! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="evolution_intro"> Now, let's let our population of players <i>evolve over time</i>. It's a 3-step dance: </p> <p id="evolution_intro_1"> <b>1. PLAY A TOURNAMENT</b><br> Let them all play against each other, and tally up their scores. </p> <p id="evolution_intro_2"> <b>2. ELIMINATE LOSERS</b><br> Get rid of the 5 worst players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them) </p> <p id="evolution_intro_3"> <b>3. REPRODUCE WINNERS</b><br> Clone the 5 best players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them) </p> <p id="evolution_intro_footer"> ...and REPEAT, for as long as you'd like. Note: you don't have to wait for people to literally die & reproduce for culture to evolve -- all that's needed is that "unsuccessful" behaviors go away, and "successful" behaviors are imitated. So now... </p> <p id="evolution_intro_button"> ...let's see this in action. → </p> <p id="evo_1"> Say we start with the following population of players: <span class="all_c">15 Always Cooperates</span>, <span class="all_d">5 Always Cheats</span>, and <span class="tft">5 Copycats</span>. (We'll ignore <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> for now) <br><br> We're going to do the tournament-eliminate-reproduce dance a dozen times or so. Let's make another bet! Who do you think will win the <i>first</i> tournament? <b>PLACE YOUR BETS, AGAIN:</b> </p> <p id="evo_2_all_c"> Makes sense, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> outnumbers everyone else right now... </p> <p id="evo_2_all_d"> Makes sense, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> has a lot of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> to exploit... </p> <p id="evo_2_tft"> Makes sense, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> won the tournament last time, why not again?... </p> <p id="evo_2"> Let's see if you're correct: </p> <p id="label_play_tournament"> 1) play tournament </p> <p id="label_eliminate_bottom_5"> 2) eliminate bottom 5 </p> <p id="label_reproduce_top_5"> 3) reproduce top 5 </p> <p id="evo_3_all_c"> Alas, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3_all_d"> Sadly, you were correct! The <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> won this time, and their numbers increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3_tft"> Alas, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> did not win – but at least they didn't do as bad as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>. They got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5. </p> <p id="evo_3"> But let's try a few more rounds of this... </p> <p id="evo_4"> <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> is still growing, at the expense of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>... </p> <p id="evo_5"> And now, all the <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> are dead. But, wait... </p> <p id="evo_6"> That's right: the <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> became a victim of their own success! They exploited the naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperators</span>, but once they ran out of them, they had to face the <span class="tft">Copycats</span>: who <i>are</i> nice, but not naive. </p> <!-- TODO: Freeman-Dyson???? --> <p id="evo_7"> By simply copying the other player's moves, <span class="tft">Copycats</span> can play nice with each other, while <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> just cheat themselves! Not only that, but it also means <span class="tft">Copycat</span> can give <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> a taste of their own medicine. </p> <p id="evo_8"> And so, as a result... </p> <p id="evo_9"> ...<span class="tft">Copycat</span> inherits the earth. </p> <p id="evo_9_all_c"> So, although your bet was off -- the nice-but-naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperators</span> were doomed from the start -- in the end, a <i>smart</i> form of niceness prevailed, and the <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> were squashed. </p> <p id="evo_9_all_d"> So, in the short run you were right - <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> won the first few rounds, but in the end, its exploitativeness was its downfall. </p> <p id="evo_9_tft"> So, in the long run, you were right - <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins! <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> may have won in the short run, but its exploitativeness was its downfall. </p> <p id="evo_9_end"> This reminds me of a quote: <br><br> <i>"We are punished by our sins, not for them."</i><br> ~ Elbert Hubbard </p> <p id="evo_9_btn"> (oh, and by the way...) </p> <p id="evo_10"> (...this result is similar even if we put <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> back in:) </p> <p id="evo_autoplay"> start the evolution process! </p> <p id="evo_autoplay_stop"> stop the evolution process </p> <p id="evo_10_followup"> (Note: sometimes, a few <span class="grudge">Grudgers</span> may stick around, because when all players except <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="tft">Copycat</span> are eliminated, the two tie.) <br><br> So, it seems the math of game theory is telling us something: that <span class="tft">Copycat's</span> philosophy, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you", may be not just a <i>moral</i> truth, but also a <i>mathematical</i> truth. However... </p> <p id="evo_10_btn"> ...there's a problem: → </p> <p id="evo_11"> Look around. The world's full of total jerkwads. <br><br> If <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is the strategy in this repeated game of trust that's so powerful -- that even soldiers in World War I trenches independently "evolved" a similar strategy, called "live and let live" -- why, then, are there so many un-trusting, un-trustworthy people? What's causing our epidemic of un-trust? <br><br> A clue's in that sentence itself. "In <i>this</i> repeated game of trust." So far we've only talked about change in the players: what about <i>a change in the game?</i> What could lead to... </p> <p id="evo_11_btn"> ...the evolution of <i>distrust?</i> </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - DISTRUST - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="distrust_1"> Before everything goes to heck, let's start with something nice! Here's a world filled entirely with <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span>, except for one <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> and one <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. <br><br> Use the buttons on the right to <b>START</b> the sim, go through it <b>step-by-step</b>, or <b>reset</b> it. → </p> <p id="distrust_2"> As you already know, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins handily in the long run, under our current rules! <br><br> But that's under our <i>current</i> rules, which say that players play against each other for <i>10</i> rounds per match. Does <span class="tft">Copycat</span> still win at 7 rounds? 5 rounds? 3? 2? 1? <br><br> <b>Change the number of rounds</b> with the slider below, then <b>START</b> the sim, and see what happens. Feel free to experiment! </p> <p id="distrust_2_end"> once you're done playing around, click: </p> <p id="distrust_3"> As you saw, if you don't play enough rounds, (here: 5 or less) <span class="all_d">ALWAYS CHEAT</span> dominates. <br><br> In 1985, when Americans were asked how many close friends they had, the most common answer was "three". In 2004, the most common answer was <i>"zero"</i>. We now have fewer friends across class, racial, economic, and political lines, because we have fewer friends -- <i>period.</i> And as you just discovered for yourself, <b>the fewer "repeat interactions" there are, the more distrust will spread.</b> <br><br> (no, mass media doesn't count: it must be <i>two-way</i> interactions between <i>specific individuals</i>.) </p> <p id="distrust_3_btn"> and oh, it gets worse... → </p> <p id="distrust_4"> There's <i>another</i> way to breed distrust. Here are the "payoffs" for the trust game: </p> <p id="distrust_4_2"> With the normal payoffs, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins. But now, <b>change the "both cooperate" reward from +2 to +1</b>, then click <b>START</b>. Even though +1 is still <i>more</i> than the punishment for both cheating (0)... what happens? </p> <p id="distrust_4_note"> feel free to play around with different payoffs! once you're done, click: </p> <p id="distrust_4_note_2"> (simulating: 10 rounds per match) </p> <p id="distrust_5"> The same thing happens: with a lower "win-win" reward, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> takes over. Game theory has two powerful ideas about this: <br><br> <b>"Zero-sum game".</b> This is the sadly common belief that a gain for "us" <i>must</i> come at a loss to "them", and vice versa. <br><br> <b>"Non-zero-sum game".</b> This is when people make the hard effort to create a win-win solution! (or at least, avoid a lose-lose) Without the non-zero-sum game, <i>trust cannot evolve.</i> <br><br> Speaking of which, let's now look at our third & final barrier to the evolution of trust... </p> <p id="distrust_5_btn"> <s>Misteaks</s> Mistakes. → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - NOISE! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="noise_1"> As cool as <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is, it has a huge, fatal weakness I haven't mentioned yet. To understand the problem, let's say two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other: </p> <p id="noise_1_end"> Being "nice" players, both their first moves will be: </p> <p id="noise_2"> And normally, they'd just pay back each others' kindness and sing Kumbaya until the end of time. </p> <p id="noise_2_end"> But what if, while trying to reciprocate goodness... </p> <p id="noise_3"> <b>OH NO</b> <br> Mistakes, miscommunication, misinterpretations -- accidents happen all the time in real life. </p> <p id="noise_3_end"> But if the other person doesn't <i>think</i> it was an accident... </p> <p id="noise_4"> <b>OH NO TIMES TWO</b> <br> The other player, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, <i>had</i> to retaliate... </p> <p id="noise_4_end"> ...and you, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span> as well, will <i>also</i> have to retaliate... </p> <p id="noise_5"> Thus, like the Hatfields and McCoys, these two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> will spiral into an endless cycle of vengeance... that started over a single mistake, long ago. </p> <p id="noise_5_end"> Tragic. But now, are there <i>other</i> types of players who can... </p> <p id="noise_5_btn"> ...deal with mistakes? → </p> <p id="noise_characters"> Let's meet some new faces! (or, new hats, anyway) </p> <p id="character_tf2t"> <b>COPYKITTEN:</b><br> Hello! I'm like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row. After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purrrrr </p> <p id="character_pavlov"> <b>SIMPLETON:</b><br> hi i try start cooperate. if you cooperate back, i do <i>same thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake. if you cheat back, i do <i>opposite thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake. </p> <p id="character_random"> <b>RANDOM:</b><br> <i>Monkey robot! Ninja pizza tacos! lol i'm so random</i><br> (Just plays Cheat or Cooperate randomly with a 50/50 chance) </p> <p id="noise_characters_end"> Alright, let's see how well these peeps do when they... </p> <p id="noise_characters_btn"> ...play in a tournament → </p> <p id="noise_evo_1"> Let's start with a dozen <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span>, versus our old winner, the fair <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, and our three new characters: the forgiving <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span>, the dull <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span>, and the silly <span class="random">Random</span>. <br><br> In each round of a match, players have a small chance of making a mistake. (let's say, 5%) Who do you think will come out on top? <b>Think carefully, then PLACE YOUR BETS:</b> </p> <p id="noise_evo_2"> Alright, you bet [CHAR] wins. Let's find out! Use the controls to your left to <b>START</b> the sim in quick mode, or go through it <b>step-by-step</b>. </p> <p id="noise_evo_2_2_correct"> You were correct -- </p> <p id="noise_evo_2_2_incorrect"> Your bet was close, but no cigar -- </p> <p id="noise_evo_2_2"> <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> wins! This is because <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> is actually capable of exploiting <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>. They both start cooperating, but if <span class="pavlov">Simpleton</span> makes a mistake and cheats, since <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> never retaliates, <i>it'll keep cheating them</i>. </p> <p id="noise_evo_2_2_btn"> Now let's try... </p> <p id="noise_evo_3"> ...the same thing as before, except instead of half-<span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>, it's half-<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>. It's a much <i>less</i> forgiving, <i>more</i> hostile environment. <br><br> Who do you think will win now? <b>Think, then PLACE YOUR BETS:</b> </p> <p id="noise_evo_4"> You bet on [CHAR]. Again, go through the simulation... </p> <p id="noise_evo_4_2_correct"> You were right on the money -- </p> <p id="noise_evo_4_2_incorrect"> Good guess, but someone else took the prize -- </p> <p id="noise_evo_4_2"> <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins this time! That's surprising that with an even <i>meaner</i> starting population, <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span>, a <i>more forgiving</i> version of <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, was the most successful! (note: <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> is so forgiving it doesn't even <i>entirely</i> wipe out <span class="tft">Copycat</span>. it shares room) <br><br> In this case, a bit of "miscommunication" (5% chance of mistake each round) could lead to more <i>forgiveness</i>. But is this true for <i>all</i> levels... </p> <p id="noise_evo_4_2_btn"> ...of miscommunication? </p> <p id="noise_evo_5"> <b>Use the slider below to change the amount of "miscommunication", then hit START.</b> At 5%, <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins. What happens at 0%? Or 20%? Or 50%? (it only goes up to 50%, because at that point, <i>every</i> move is a coin flip) </p> <p id="noise_evo_5_continue"> When you're done playing around, click: </p> <p id="noise_evo_6"> The results turn out something like this:<br> <b>At 0%,</b> the fair <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins! <b>At 1% to 9%,</b> the forgiving <span class="tf2t">Copykitten</span> wins! <b>At 10% to 49%:</b> the unfair, unforgiving <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> wins. <b>At 50%,</b> <i>nobody wins ever.</i> <br><br> This is why "miscommunication" is such an interesting barrier to trust: a <i>little</i> bit of it leads to forgiveness, but <i>too much</i> and it leads to widespread distrust! I think our modern media technology, as much as it's helped us increase communication... has increased our <i>miscommunication</i> much more. <br><br> At last, let's experiment with <i>all</i> the numbers, the knobs and sliders. Let's play... </p> <p id="noise_evo_6_btn"> ...in the Sandbox Mode! </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - SANDBOX! - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="sandbox_population"> Start off with this distribution of players: </p> <p id="sandbox_payoffs"> The payoffs in a one-on-one game are: </p> <p id="sandbox_reset_payoffs"> set default </p> <!-- When translating the following, keep the "[N]", with square brackets, as a placeholder for the number. Some of these need double-translations, one for the plural version, one for the singular version. --> <p id="sandbox_rules_1"> Play [N] rounds per match: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_1_single"> Play [N] round per match: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_2"> After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] players & reproduce the top [N] players: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_2_single"> After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] player & reproduce the top [N] player: </p> <p id="sandbox_rules_3"> During each round, there's a [N]% chance a player makes a mistake: </p> <p id="sandbox_end"> <b>NOTE: Sandbox Mode is totally optional.</b> Feel free to skip it, or play around! Once you're done, let's recap... </p> <p id="sandbox_end_btn"> what we learnt today! → </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - CONCLUSION! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="conclusion_0"> Game theory has shown us the three things we need for the evolution of trust: </p> <p id="conclusion_1_a"> 1. REPEAT INTERACTIONS </p> <p id="conclusion_1_a2"> Trust keeps a relationship going, but you need the knowledge of possible future repeat interactions <i>before</i> trust can evolve. </p> <p id="conclusion_2_a"> 2. POSSIBLE WIN-WINS </p> <p id="conclusion_2_a2"> You must be playing a non-zero-sum game, a game where it's at least possible that <i>both</i> players can be better off -- a win-win. </p> <p id="conclusion_3_a"> 3. LOW MISCOMMUNICATION </p> <p id="conclusion_3_a2"> The level of miscommunication can't be <i>too</i> high. And when there's a little bit of miscommunication, it pays to be <i>more</i> forgiving. </p> <p id="conclusion_4"> Of course, real-world trust is affected by much more than this. There's reputation, shared values, contracts, cultural markers, blah blah blah. And let's not forget... </p> <p id="conclusion_btn"> ...the <i>biggest</i> lesson. → </p> <p id="outro_1"> If there's one big takeaway<br> from <i>all</i> of game theory, it's this: <br><br> <b>What the game is, defines what the players do.</b><br> Our problem today isn't just that people are losing trust,<br> it's that our <i>environment</i> acts against the evolution of trust. <br><br> That may seem cynical or naive -- that we're "merely" products of our environment -- but as game theory reminds us, we <i>are</i> each others' environment. <b>In the short run, the game defines the players. But in the long run, it's us players who define the game.</b> <br><br> So, do what <i>you</i> can do, to create the conditions necessary to evolve trust. Build relationships. Find win-wins. Communicate clearly. Maybe then, we can stop firing at each other, get out of our own trenches, cross No Man's Land to come together... </p> <p id="outro_1_btn"> and all learn... </p> <p id="outro_2"> ...to live and let live. </p> <p id="outro_2_credits"> "A Christmas Truce between Opposing Trenches" Illustrated by AC Michael. Published in <i>The Illustrated London News</i>, January 9, 1915. </p> <p id="outro_2_btn"> <3 </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - CREDITS! - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="credits"> <span class="credits"> created by:<br> <span class="big">NICKY CASE</span><br> <a href="http://ncase.me/" target="_blank">play my other shtuff</a> • <a href="https://twitter.com/ncasenmare" target="_blank">follow my tweeter</a> <br> <a href="https://github.com/ncase/trust/#play-it-here-httpncasemetrust" target="_blank">download the music & source code</a> <span class="divider"></span> based off robert axelrod's 1984 book,<br> <span class="big">"THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION"</span><br> <a href="notes" target="_blank">read my footnotes for this game</a> <span class="divider"></span> lots of love and thanks to<br> <span class="big">MY PATREON SUPPORTERS</span><br> <a href="peeps" target="_blank">see my drawings of 'em</a> • <a href="https://www.patreon.com/ncase" target="_blank">throw coins at me on patreon <3</a> <span class="divider"></span> p.s: want more learning-by-playing?<br> check out <a href="http://explorabl.es/" target="_blank">explorable explanations</a>! </span> </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - THE PLAYERS - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_tft">Copycat</p> <p id="label_short_tft"> copycat </p> <p id="icon_tft"> <span class="tft"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Copycat</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_all_d">Always Cheat</p> <p id="label_short_all_d"> cheater </p> <p id="icon_all_d"> <span class="all_d"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">All Cheat</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_all_c">Always Cooperate</p> <p id="label_short_all_c"> cooperator </p> <p id="icon_all_c"> <span class="all_c"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">All Cooperate</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_grudge">Grudger</p> <p id="label_short_grudge"> grudger </p> <p id="icon_grudge"> <span class="grudge"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Grudger</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_prober">Detective</p> <p id="label_short_prober"> detective </p> <p id="icon_prober"> <span class="prober"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Detective</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_tf2t">Copykitten</p> <p id="label_short_tf2t"> copykitten </p> <p id="icon_tf2t"> <span class="tf2t"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Copykitten</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_pavlov">Simpleton</p> <p id="label_short_pavlov"> simpleton </p> <p id="icon_pavlov"> <span class="pavlov"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Simpleton</span> </span> </p> <p id="label_random">Random</p> <p id="label_short_random"> random </p> <p id="icon_random"> <span class="random"> <span class="icon"></span> <span class="icon_label">Random</span> </span> </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - SMALL LABELS! - - - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="label_cooperate"> cooperate </p> <p id="label_cheat"> cheat </p> <p id="label_play"> play </p> <p id="label_start"> START </p> <p id="label_stop"> STOP </p> <p id="label_step"> step </p> <p id="label_reset"> reset </p> <p id="label_population"> population </p> <p id="label_payoffs"> payoffs </p> <p id="label_rules"> rules </p> <p id="label_next"> next → </p> <p id="label_continue"> continue </p> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <!-- - - - NAVIGATING CHAPTERS - - - --> <!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --> <p id="chapter_intro"> 0. Introduction </p> <p id="chapter_oneoff"> 1. One Game </p> <p id="chapter_iterated"> 2. Repeated Game </p> <p id="chapter_tournament"> 3. One Tournament </p> <p id="chapter_evolution"> 4. Repeated Tournament </p> <p id="chapter_distrust"> 5. The Evolution of Distrust </p> <p id="chapter_noise"> 6. Making Mistaeks </p> <p id="chapter_sandbox"> 7. Sandbox Mode </p> <p id="chapter_conclusion"> 8. Conclusion </p> <p id="chapter_credits"> 9. Credits </p>