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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - TITLE! - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="title">
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<span style="font-size:0.75em">THE</span><br>
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EVOLUTION<br>
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<span style="font-size:0.75em">OF TRUST</span>
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</p>
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<p id="subtitle">
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playing time: 30 min • by nicky case, july 2017
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</p>
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<p id="loading">
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loading...
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</p>
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<p id="loading_done">
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PLAY →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - INTRO! - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TODO: Focus ONLY on social trust, not governments -->
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<!-- TODO: Also, strong early humor. -->
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<!-- TODO: "You guys, it's time for some game theory". -->
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<!-- TODO: "live and let live". -->
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<!-- TODO: it's sometimes RATIONAL to distrust: loop of trust & trustworthiness. -->
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<p id="intro">
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During World War I, peace broke out.
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<br><br>
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It was Christmas 1914 on the Western Front.<br>
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Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chill out with the enemy, British<br>
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and German soldiers left their trenches, crossed No Man's Land,<br>
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and gathered together to bury their dead, to exchange gifts, to sing.
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<br><br>
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Meanwhile: it's 2017, the West has been at peace for decades, and<br>
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we're less trusting than ever. Fewer and fewer people say they trust their<br>
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governments, their media, or even <i>each other</i>. So here's our puzzle:
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<br><br>
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<b>Why & when do friends become enemies?<br>
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or: Why & when do enemies become friends?</b>
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<br><br>
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I think game theory can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br>
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and how we can fix it! So, to understand all this...
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</p>
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<p id="intro_button">
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...let's play a game. →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - ONE OFF! - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="label_you_cooperate">
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you<br>cooperate
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</p>
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<p id="label_you_cheat">
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you<br>cheat
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</p>
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<p id="label_they_cooperate">
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they<br>cooperate
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</p>
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<p id="label_they_cheat">
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they<br>cheat
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</p>
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<p id="label_you">
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you<br>↙
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</p>
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<p id="label_them">
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other player<br>↘
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_0_top">
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<b>THE GAME OF TRUST</b>
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<br>
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You have one choice.
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In front of you is a machine: if you put a coin in the machine,
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the <i>other player</i> gets three coins – and vice versa.
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You both can either choose to COOPERATE (put in coin), or CHEAT (don't put in coin).
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_0_btm">
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Let's say the other player cheats, and doesn't put in a coin.<br>
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What should you do?
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_1_cheated">
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Exactly! Why let that moocher mooch off of you?
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_1_cooperated">
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Alas, turning the other cheek just gets you slapped!
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_1_top">
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If you cooperate & they cheat, you lose a coin while they gain three. (score: -1 vs +3)
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However, if you both cheat, neither of you gain or lose anything. (score: 0 vs 0)
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<b>Therefore: you should CHEAT.</b>
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_1_btm">
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But let's say the other player cooperates, and puts in a coin.<br>
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What should you do now?
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_cheated">
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Wow, that's mean... and also the correct answer!
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_cooperated">
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Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <i>OR IS IT??</i>
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_top">
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Because if you both cooperate, you both give up a coin to gain three. (score: +2 vs +2)
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But if you cheat & they cooperate, you gain three coins at their cost of one. (score: +3 vs -1)
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<b>Therefore: you "should" still CHEAT.</b>
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_2_btm">
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And <i>that's</i> the dilemma of trust.
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You'd both be better off trusting each other, but trust leaves you vulnerable.
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But what happens if we can...
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</p>
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<p id="oneoff_button_next">
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...play more than once? →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - ITERATED - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TO DO: WEAVE IN MORE ABOUT TRENCHES. "CHOOSE WISELY" -->
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<p id="iterated_intro_top">
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<b>Now, let's play for real.</b><br>
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You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own "personality".
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With each opponent, you'll play anywhere between 3 to 7 rounds.
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Can you trust them? Or rather... can they trust <i>you?</i>
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_intro_btm">
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Choose your first, <b>real</b> move:
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_info_1">
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opponent: [X] of [Y]
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</p>
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_info_2">
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your total score:
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_start">
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And your total score is...
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_1">
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which is, wow, actually <i>impressively</i> bad.
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_2">
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which, uh, could be worse!
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_3">
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which ain't bad!
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_4">
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which is pretty good!
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_5">
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which is <i>perfect!</i> Congrats you have too much time on your hands.
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_x">
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...i have no idea how you did that.
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</p>
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<p id="iterated_score_end">
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(the lowest & highest possible scores are 8 and 49, respectively)
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</p>
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<p id="who_were">
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So who were these strange characters you just played against?
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</p>
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<p id="character_tft">
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<b>COPYCAT:</b>
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Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow
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</p>
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<p id="character_all_d">
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<b>ALWAYS CHEAT:</b>
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<i>the strong shall eat the weak</i>
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</p>
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<p id="character_all_c">
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<b>ALWAYS COOPERATE:</b>
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Let's be best friends! <3
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</p>
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<p id="character_grudge">
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<b>GRUDGER:</b>
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Listen, pardner. I'll start cooperatin', and keep cooperation',
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but if y'all ever cheat me, I'LL CHEAT YOU BACK 'TIL THE END OF TARNATION.
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</p>
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<p id="character_prober">
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<b>DETECTIVE:</b>
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First: I analyze you. I start: Cooperate, Cheat, Cooperate, Cooperate.
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If you cheat back, I'll act like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>.
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If you never cheat back, I'll act like <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, to exploit you.
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Elementary, my dear Watson.
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</p>
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<p id="characters_teaser">
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Now, what if these characters were to play...
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</p>
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<p id="characters_button">
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...against each other? →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - TOURNAMENT! - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="place_your_bets">
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It's tournament time!
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Each character will now play against every other character:
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that's 10 paired matches, and 10 rounds per match.
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<br><br>
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Who do you think will get the highest <i>total</i> score?
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Think carefully about it, and then<br>
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<b>PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_intro">
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Alright, you placed your bet on [CHAR]!
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Let's go through the matches one by one, and see how the tournament plays out...
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</p>
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<p id="first_match">
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first match →
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</p>
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<p id="next_match">
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next match →
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</p>
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<p id="match_header_1">
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<b>Match #[N]:</b> [A] vs [B]
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</p>
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<p id="match_header_2">
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<b>Rounds:</b>
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</p>
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<p id="match_header_3">
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<b>Total Scores:</b> [A] vs [B]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_1">
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_2">
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Oh, by the way...
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_3">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_4">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_5">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_6">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_7">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_8">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_9">
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[trench live & let live stuff]
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_10">
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Anyway -- and the winner is...
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</p>
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<p id="the_winner_is">
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(drumroll please...) →
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_1">
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<b class="tft">COPYCAT!</b>
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_2_yay">
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Congrats, you placed your bet on the right horse.
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_2_nay">
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(Sorry, [CHAR].)
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_winner_3">
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<span class="tft">Copycat</span> goes by many names.
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The Golden Rule, reciprocal altruism, tit for tat, or... <b>live and let live.</b>
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That's why "peace" could emerge in the trenches of World War I:
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when you're forced to play the same game with the
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same <i>specific people</i> (not just the same generic "enemy") over and over again --
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<span class="tft">Copycat</span> doesn't just win the battle, it wins the war.
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<br><br>
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But if things change a lot when you play multiple rounds of the same game, what if we play...
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</p>
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<p id="tournament_teaser">
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...multiple <i>tournaments?</i> →
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</p>
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - EVOLUTION! - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="evolution_intro">
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Now, let's let our population of players <i>evolve over time</i>. It's a 3-step dance:
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</p>
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<p id="evolution_intro_1">
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<b>1. PLAY A TOURNAMENT</b><br>
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Let them all play against each other, and tally up their scores.
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</p>
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<p id="evolution_intro_2">
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<b>2. ELIMINATE LOSERS</b><br>
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Get rid of the 5 worst players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them)
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</p>
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<p id="evolution_intro_3">
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<b>3. REPRODUCE WINNERS</b><br>
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Clone the 5 best players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them)
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</p>
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<p id="evolution_intro_footer">
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...and REPEAT, for as long as you'd like.
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Note: you don't have to wait for people to literally die & reproduce for culture to evolve --
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all that's needed is that "unsuccessful" behaviors go away, and "successful" behaviors are imitated.
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So now...
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</p>
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<p id="evolution_intro_button">
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...let's see this in action. →
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</p>
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<p id="evo_1">
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Say we start with the following population of players:
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<span class="all_c">15 Always Cooperates</span>,
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<span class="all_d">5 Always Cheats</span>, and
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<span class="tft">5 Copycats</span>.
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|
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(We'll ignore <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> for now)
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|
<br><br>
|
|
|
We're going to do the tournament-eliminate-reproduce dance a dozen times or so.
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|
|
Let's make another bet! Who do you think will win the <i>first</i> tournament?
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</p>
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<p id="evo_2_all_c">
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|
|
Makes sense, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> outnumbers everyone else right now...
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</p>
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<p id="evo_2_all_d">
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|
Makes sense, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> has a lot of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> to exploit...
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</p>
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<p id="evo_2_tft">
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|
|
Makes sense, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> won the tournament last time, why not again?...
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</p>
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<p id="evo_2">
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|
|
Let's see if you're correct:
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</p>
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|
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<p id="label_play_tournament">
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|
|
1) play tournament
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</p>
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<p id="label_eliminate_bottom_5">
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2) eliminate bottom 5
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</p>
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<p id="label_reproduce_top_5">
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3) reproduce top 5
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</p>
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<p id="evo_3_all_c">
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|
|
Alas, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> got eaten up by
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<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5.
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</p>
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|
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<p id="evo_3_all_d">
|
|
|
Sadly, you were correct! The <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> won this time,
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and their numbers increased by 5.
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</p>
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<p id="evo_3_tft">
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|
Alas, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> did not win – but at least they didn't do as bad
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|
as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>, who got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>,
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|
whose numbers have now increased by 5.
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|
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</p>
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<p id="evo_3">
|
|
|
But let's try a few more rounds of this...
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</p>
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<p id="evo_4">
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|
|
<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> is still growing,
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|
at the expense of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>...
|
|
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</p>
|
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<p id="evo_5">
|
|
|
And now, all the <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> are dead.
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|
But, wait...
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|
|
</p>
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|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_6">
|
|
|
That's right: the <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> became a victim of their own success!
|
|
|
They exploited the naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span>,
|
|
|
but once they ran out of them, they had to face the <span class="tft">Copycats</span>:
|
|
|
who <i>are</i> nice, but not naive.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- TODO: Freeman-Dyson???? -->
|
|
|
<!-- TODO: (other strategies will be introduced later) -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_7">
|
|
|
By simply copying the other player's moves,
|
|
|
<span class="tft">Copycats</span> can play nice with each other,
|
|
|
while <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> just cheat themselves.
|
|
|
Not only that, but it also means <span class="tft">Copycat</span>
|
|
|
can give <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>
|
|
|
a taste of their own medicine.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_8">
|
|
|
And so, as a result...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9">
|
|
|
...<span class="tft">Copycat</span> inherits the earth.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9_all_c">
|
|
|
So, although your bet was off -- the nice-but-naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span>
|
|
|
were doomed from the start -- in the end, a <i>smart</i> form of niceness prevailed,
|
|
|
and the <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> were squashed.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9_all_d">
|
|
|
So, in the short run you were right - <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> won the first few rounds,
|
|
|
but in the end, its exploitativeness was its downfall.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9_tft">
|
|
|
So, in the long run, you were right - <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins!
|
|
|
<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> may have won in the short run,
|
|
|
but its exploitativeness was its downfall.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9_end">
|
|
|
This reminds me of a quote:
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
<i>"We are punished by our sins, not for them."</i><br>
|
|
|
~ Elbert Hubbard
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_9_btn">
|
|
|
(oh, and by the way...)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_10">
|
|
|
(...this result is similar even if we put
|
|
|
<span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="prober">Detective</span> back in:)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_autoplay">
|
|
|
start the evolution process!
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_autoplay_stop">
|
|
|
stop the evolution process
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- More reference to game theory earlier? -->
|
|
|
<!-- TODO: More "me" and "I"??? -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_10_followup">
|
|
|
(Note: occasionally, a few <span class="grudge">Grudgers</span> may stick around,
|
|
|
because when all players except <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> & <span class="tft">Copycat</span>
|
|
|
are eliminated, the two tie.)
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
So, it seems the math of game theory is telling us something:
|
|
|
that <span class="tft">Copycat's</span> philosophy,
|
|
|
"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you", may be not just a
|
|
|
<i>moral</i> truth, but also a <i>mathematical</i> truth.
|
|
|
However...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_10_btn">
|
|
|
...there's a problem: →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="evo_11">
|
|
|
There are jerks. Look around.
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
If <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is the strategy in this repeated game of trust that's so powerful --
|
|
|
that even soldiers in World War I trenches independently "evolved" a similar strategy, called "live and let live" --
|
|
|
why, then, are there so many un-trusting, un-trustworthy people?
|
|
|
What's causing our epidemic of un-trust?
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
A clue's in that sentence itself. "In <i>this</i> repeated game of trust."
|
|
|
So far we've only talked about change in the players:
|
|
|
what about <i>a change in the game?</i>
|
|
|
What could lead to...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="evo_11_btn">
|
|
|
...the evolution of <i>distrust?</i>
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - DISTRUST - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_1">
|
|
|
Before everything goes to heck, let's start with something nice!
|
|
|
Here's a world filled entirely with <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span>,
|
|
|
except for one <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> and one <span class="tft">Copycat</span>.
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
Use the buttons on the right to <b>start</b> the sim,
|
|
|
go through it <b>step-by-step</b>, or <b>reset</b> it. →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_2">
|
|
|
As you already know, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins handily in the long run,
|
|
|
under our current rules!
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
But that's under our <i>current</i> rules, which say that
|
|
|
players play against each other for <i>10</i> rounds per match.
|
|
|
Does <span class="tft">Copycat</span> still win at 7 rounds? 5 rounds? 3? 2? 1?
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
<b>Change the number of rounds</b> with the slider below,
|
|
|
<b>start</b> the sim, and see what happens.
|
|
|
Feel free to experiment as much as you'd like!
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_2_end">
|
|
|
once you're done playing around, click:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_3">
|
|
|
As you saw, when people play below some number of rounds,
|
|
|
<span class="all_d">ALWAYS CHEAT</span> dominates.
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
In 1985, when Americans were asked how many close friends they had,
|
|
|
the most common answer was "three". In 2004, the most common answer was <i>"zero"</i>.
|
|
|
We now have fewer friends across class, racial, economic, and political lines,
|
|
|
because we have fewer friends -- <i>period.</i>
|
|
|
And as you just discovered for yourself,
|
|
|
<b>the fewer "repeat interactions" there are, the more distrust will spread.</b>
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
(no, mass media doesn't count:
|
|
|
it must be <i>two-way</i> interactions between <i>specific individuals</i>.)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_3_btn">
|
|
|
and oh, it gets worse... →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_4">
|
|
|
There's <i>another</i> way to breed distrust.
|
|
|
Here are the "payoffs" for the trust game:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_4_2">
|
|
|
Let's start with a mostly-<span class="tft">Copycat</span> world. Normally, they'd win.
|
|
|
But now, <b>change the "trust" reward from +2 to +1,
|
|
|
then click start. →</b>
|
|
|
Even though +1 is still <i>more</i> than the punishment for mutual distrust (0)...
|
|
|
what happens?
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_4_note">
|
|
|
feel free to play around with different payoffs!
|
|
|
once you're done, click:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_4_note_2">
|
|
|
(simulating: 10 rounds per match)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_5">
|
|
|
The same thing happens: <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> dominates.
|
|
|
So even if the reward for getting a "win-win" is still <i>more</i>
|
|
|
than the punishment for a "lose-lose"...
|
|
|
<b>if the reward for mutual trust is <i>too</i> low, distrust evolves.</b>
|
|
|
<br><br>
|
|
|
I think, as a culture, we're losing the value of finding "win-wins".
|
|
|
We're more interested in "win-lose", because viciousness gets views, conflict gets clicks.
|
|
|
It's live and let <i>die.</i>
|
|
|
Maybe I'm just overthinking things, maybe I'm just old and shaking my fist at a cloud...
|
|
|
but don't you feel it? That we've forgotten something?...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_5_btn">
|
|
|
...whatevs i dunno →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_6">
|
|
|
Aaaaanyway, now you can change <i>both</i> rules!
|
|
|
(click <b>start</b> to see how, with weird payoffs, the sim
|
|
|
"swings" between <span class="all_d">Cheats</span> & <span class="all_c">Cooperates</span>...)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_6_end">
|
|
|
Once you're done experimenting with this,
|
|
|
let's look at our final barrier to trust...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="distrust_6_btn">
|
|
|
<s>Misteaks</s> Mistakes. →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - NOISE! - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_1">
|
|
|
As cool as <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is, it has a huge, fatal weakness I haven't mentioned yet.
|
|
|
To understand it, let's say two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_1_end">
|
|
|
Being "nice" players, both their first moves will be:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_2">
|
|
|
And normally, they'd just pay back each others' kindness and sing Kumbaya until the end of time.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_2_end">
|
|
|
But what if, while trying to reciprocate...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_3">
|
|
|
<b>OH NO</b>
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
Mistakes, miscommunication, misinterpretations -- accidents happen all the time in real life.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_3_end">
|
|
|
But if the other person doesn't <i>think</i> it was an accident...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_4">
|
|
|
<b>OH NO AGAIN</b>
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
The other player, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, <i>had</i> to retaliate...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_4_end">
|
|
|
...and you, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span> as well, will <i>also</i> have to retaliate...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_5">
|
|
|
Thus, like the Hatfields and McCoys,
|
|
|
these two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> will spiral into an endless cycle of vengeance...
|
|
|
that started over a single mistake, long, long ago.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_5_end">
|
|
|
Tragic. But now, are there <i>other</i> types of players who can...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_5_btn">
|
|
|
...deal with mistakes? →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_characters">
|
|
|
Let's meet some new faces!
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="character_tf2t">
|
|
|
<b>COPYKITTEN:</b><br>
|
|
|
Hello! I'm like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>,
|
|
|
except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row.
|
|
|
After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purrrrr
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="character_pavlov">
|
|
|
<b>SIMPLETON:</b><br>
|
|
|
hi i try start cooperate.
|
|
|
if you cooperate back, i do <i>same thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake.
|
|
|
if you cheat back, i do <i>opposite thing</i> as last move, even if it mistake.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="character_random">
|
|
|
<b>RANDOM:</b><br>
|
|
|
<i>Monkey robot! Ninja pizza tacos! lol i'm so random</i><br>
|
|
|
(Just plays Cheat or Cooperate randomly with a 50/50 chance)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="noise_characters_end">
|
|
|
Alright, let's see how well these peeps do when they...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_characters_btn">
|
|
|
...play in a tournament →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- fixed 5% chance: winner simpleton, then copykitten -->
|
|
|
<!-- Need to simulate first to write words, i dunno -->
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_1">
|
|
|
Noise Evolution, place your bets.
|
|
|
At <b>5% noise</b>
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_2">
|
|
|
Try it, controls to the left
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_2_2">
|
|
|
Simpleton wins, but let's try...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_3">
|
|
|
...different scenario, place your bets again.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_4">
|
|
|
Try it, controls to the left, again
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_4_2">
|
|
|
Ooh, surprising... but is that true if there's a LOT of noise?
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_5">
|
|
|
GIVE A SLIDER FOR NOISE.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_6">
|
|
|
Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_6_continue">
|
|
|
Explain nonlinear barrier, and real life. Also sandbox.
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="noise_evo_6_btn">
|
|
|
Teaser for sandbox
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - SANDBOX! - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_population">
|
|
|
Start off with this distribution of players:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_payoffs">
|
|
|
The payoffs in a one-on-one game are:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_reset_payoffs">
|
|
|
set default
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!--
|
|
|
When translating the following, keep the "[N]", with square brackets,
|
|
|
as a placeholder for the number. Some of these need double-translations,
|
|
|
one for the plural version, one for the singular version.
|
|
|
-->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_rules_1">
|
|
|
Play [N] rounds per match:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_rules_1_single">
|
|
|
Play [N] round per match:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_rules_2">
|
|
|
After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] players & reproduce the top [N] players:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_rules_2_single">
|
|
|
After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] player & reproduce the top [N] player:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_rules_3">
|
|
|
During each round, there's a [N]% chance a player makes a mistake:
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_end">
|
|
|
...once you're done playing around, let's recap
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="sandbox_end_btn">
|
|
|
what we've learnt →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - CONCLUSION! - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="conclusion_1">
|
|
|
|
|
|
TRUST:
|
|
|
- repeated interaction:
|
|
|
- win-win:
|
|
|
- dealing with mistakes: forgive, and try to be clear and honest yourself
|
|
|
|
|
|
DISTRUST:
|
|
|
- loss of social capital
|
|
|
- win-lose, use versus them, zero-sum
|
|
|
- gleefully punishing even small mistakes
|
|
|
|
|
|
But above all, there's also...
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="conclusion_btn">
|
|
|
...the bigger lesson →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="conclusion_2">
|
|
|
Don't hate the player, hate the game.
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
Game theory lesson.
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
Short term: game changes players. But don't be cynical
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
Long term: players change game, from the bottom up -- evolution.
|
|
|
<br>
|
|
|
So if we wanna cure our epidemic of distrust,
|
|
|
and rebuild a trusting & trustworthy civic society, it's up to all of <i>us.</i>
|
|
|
Let's all learn and act to find win-wins,
|
|
|
to create repeated interactions,
|
|
|
(and...)
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="conclusion_2">
|
|
|
...to live and let live.
|
|
|
<!-- the christmas truce pic/photo(?) circular pic... words overlaid -->
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="conclusion_button">
|
|
|
<3
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - CREDITS! - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - FEETNOTES - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - THE PLAYERS - - - - - - -->
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<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="label_tft">Copycat</p>
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<p id="label_short_tft">
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copycat
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</p>
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<p id="icon_tft">
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<span class="tft">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">Copycat</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_all_d">Always Cheat</p>
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<p id="label_short_all_d">
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cheater
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</p>
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<p id="icon_all_d">
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<span class="all_d">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">All Cheat</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_all_c">Always Cooperate</p>
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<p id="label_short_all_c">
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cooperater
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</p>
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<p id="icon_all_c">
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<span class="all_c">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">All Cooperate</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_grudge">Grudger</p>
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<p id="label_short_grudge">
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grudger
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</p>
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<p id="icon_grudge">
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<span class="grudge">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">Grudger</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_prober">Detective</p>
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<p id="label_short_prober">
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detective
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</p>
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<p id="icon_prober">
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<span class="prober">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">Detective</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_tf2t">Copykitten</p>
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<p id="label_short_tf2t">
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copykitten
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</p>
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<p id="icon_tf2t">
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<span class="tf2t">
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<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">Copykitten</span>
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</span>
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</p>
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<p id="label_pavlov">Simpleton</p>
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<p id="label_short_pavlov">
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|
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simpleton
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</p>
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<p id="icon_pavlov">
|
|
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<span class="pavlov">
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|
<span class="icon"></span>
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<span class="icon_label">Simpleton</span>
|
|
|
</span>
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</p>
|
|
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|
|
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<p id="label_random">Random</p>
|
|
|
<p id="label_short_random">
|
|
|
random
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="icon_random">
|
|
|
<span class="random">
|
|
|
<span class="icon"></span>
|
|
|
<span class="icon_label">Random</span>
|
|
|
</span>
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - SMALL LABELS! - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_cooperate">
|
|
|
cooperate
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_cheat">
|
|
|
cheat
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_play">
|
|
|
play
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_start">
|
|
|
start
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_stop">
|
|
|
stop
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_step">
|
|
|
step
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_reset">
|
|
|
reset
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_population">
|
|
|
population
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_payoffs">
|
|
|
payoffs
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_rules">
|
|
|
rules
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_next">
|
|
|
next →
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="label_continue">
|
|
|
continue
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - NAVIGATING CHAPTERS - - - -->
|
|
|
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
|
|
|
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_intro">
|
|
|
0. Introduction
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_oneoff">
|
|
|
1. One Game
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_iterated">
|
|
|
2. Repeated Game
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_tournament">
|
|
|
3. One Tournament
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_evolution">
|
|
|
4. Repeated Tournament
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_distrust">
|
|
|
5. The Evolution of Distrust
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_noise">
|
|
|
6. Making Mistaeks
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_sandbox">
|
|
|
7. Sandbox Mode
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_conclusion">
|
|
|
8. Conclusion
|
|
|
</p>
|
|
|
<p id="chapter_credits">
|
|
|
9. Credits
|
|
|
</p>
|