ncase.me-trust/lang/en.html

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<!-- - - - - - INTRO! - - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TODO: Focus ONLY on social trust, not governments -->
<!-- TODO: Also, strong early humor. -->
<!-- TODO: "You guys, it's time for some game theory". -->
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<p id="intro">
During World War I, peace broke out.
<br><br>

It was Christmas 1914 on the Western Front.<br>
Despite strict orders <i>not</i> to chill out with the enemy, British<br>
and German soldiers left their trenches, crossed No Man's Land,<br>
and gathered together to bury their dead, to exchange gifts, to sing.
<br><br>

Meanwhile: it's 2017, the West has been at peace for decades, and<br>
we're less trusting than ever. Fewer and fewer people say they trust their<br>
governments, their media, or even <i>each other</i>. So here's our puzzle:
<br><br>

<b>Why, even in good times, do friends become enemies?<br>
And why, even in bad times, do enemies become friends?</b>
<br><br>

I think game theory can help explain our epidemic of distrust –<br>
and how we can fix it! So, to understand all this...
</p>
<p id="intro_button">
...let's play a game. &rarr;
</p>

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<!-- - - - - - ONE OFF! - - - - - - - -->
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<p id="label_you_cooperate">
you<br>cooperate
</p>

<p id="label_you_cheat">
you<br>cheat
</p>

<p id="label_they_cooperate">
they<br>cooperate
</p>

<p id="label_they_cheat">
they<br>cheat
</p>

<p id="label_you">
you<br>↙
</p>
<p id="label_them">
other player<br>↘
</p>

<p id="oneoff_0_top">

<b>THE GAME OF TRUST</b>
<br>
You have one choice.
In front of you is a machine: if you put a coin in the machine,
the <i>other player</i> gets three coins – and vice versa.
You both can either choose to COOPERATE (put in coin), or CHEAT (don't put in coin).
</p>

<p id="oneoff_0_btm">
Let's say the other player cheats, and doesn't put in a coin.<br>
What should you do?
</p>

<p id="oneoff_1_cheated">
Exactly! Why let that moocher mooch off of you?
</p>

<p id="oneoff_1_cooperated">
Alas, turning the other cheek just gets you slapped!
</p>

<p id="oneoff_1_top">
If you cooperate &amp; they cheat, you lose a coin while they gain three. (score: -1 vs +3)
However, if you both cheat, neither of you gain or lose anything. (score: 0 vs 0)
<b>Therefore: you should CHEAT.</b>
</p>

<p id="oneoff_1_btm">
But let's say the other player cooperates, and puts in a coin.<br>
What should you do now?
</p>

<p id="oneoff_2_cheated">
Wow, that's mean... and also the correct answer!
</p>

<p id="oneoff_2_cooperated">
Sure, seems like the right thing to do... <i>OR IS IT??</i>
</p>

<p id="oneoff_2_top">
Because if you both cooperate, you both give up a coin to gain three. (score: +2 vs +2)
But if you cheat &amp; they cooperate, you gain three coins at their cost of one. (score: +3 vs -1)
<b>Therefore: you "should" still CHEAT.</b>
</p>

<p id="oneoff_2_btm">
And <i>that's</i> the dilemma of trust.
You'd both be better off trusting each other, but trust leaves you vulnerable.
But what happens if we can...
</p>

<p id="oneoff_button_next">
...play more than once? &rarr;
</p>

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<!-- - - - - - ITERATED - - - - - - - -->
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<!-- TO DO: WEAVE IN MORE ABOUT TRENCHES. "CHOOSE WISELY" -->

<p id="iterated_intro_top">
<b>Now, let's play for real.</b><br>
You'll be playing against 5 different opponents, each with their own "personality".
With each opponent, you'll play anywhere between 3 to 7 rounds.
Can you trust them? Or rather... can they trust <i>you?</i>
</p>

<p id="iterated_intro_btm">
Choose your first, <b>real</b> move:
</p>

<p id="iterated_info_1">
opponent: [X] of [Y]
</p>
</p>
<p id="iterated_info_2">
your total score: 
</p>

<p id="iterated_score_start">
And your total score is...
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_1">
which is, wow, actually <i>impressively</i> bad.
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_2">
which, uh, could be worse!
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_3">
which ain't bad!
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_4">
which is pretty good!
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_5">
which is <i>perfect!</i> Congrats you have too much time on your hands.
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_x">
...i have no idea how you did that.
</p>
<p id="iterated_score_end">
(the lowest &amp; highest possible scores are 8 and 49, respectively)
</p>

<p id="who_were">
So who were these strange characters you just played against?
</p>

<p id="character_tft">
<b>COPYCAT:</b>
Hello! I start with Cooperate, and afterwards, I just copy whatever you did in the last round. Meow
</p>

<p id="character_all_d">
<b>ALWAYS CHEAT:</b>
<i>the strong shall eat the weak</i>
</p>

<p id="character_all_c">
<b>ALWAYS COOPERATE:</b>
Let's be best friends! &lt;3
</p>

<p id="character_grudge">
<b>GRUDGER:</b>
Listen, pardner. I'll start cooperatin', and keep cooperation',
but if y'all ever cheat me, I'LL CHEAT YOU BACK 'TIL THE END OF TARNATION.
</p>

<p id="character_prober">
<b>DETECTIVE:</b>
First: I analyze you. I start: Cooperate, Cheat, Cooperate, Cooperate.
If you cheat back, I'll act like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>.
If you never cheat back, I'll act like <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, to exploit you.
Elementary, my dear Watson.
</p>

<p id="characters_teaser">
Now, what if these characters were to play...
</p>
<p id="characters_button">
...against each other? &rarr;
</p>


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<!-- - - - - TOURNAMENT! - - - - - - -->
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<p id="place_your_bets">
It's tournament time!
Each character will now play against every other character:
that's 10 paired matches, and 10 rounds per match.
<br><br>
Who do you think will get the highest <i>total</i> score?
Think carefully about it, and then<br>
<b>PLACE YOUR BETS:</b>
</p>

<p id="tournament_intro">
Alright, you placed your bet on [CHAR]!
Let's go through the matches one by one, and see how the tournament plays out...
</p>

<p id="first_match">
first match &rarr;
</p>

<p id="next_match">
next match &rarr;
</p>

<p id="match_header_1">
<b>Match #[N]:</b> [A] vs [B]
</p>
<p id="match_header_2">
<b>Rounds:</b>
</p>
<p id="match_header_3">
<b>Total Scores:</b> [A] vs [B]
</p>

<p id="tournament_1">
&nbsp;
</p>
<p id="tournament_2">
Oh, by the way...
</p>
<p id="tournament_3">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_4">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_5">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_6">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_7">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_8">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_9">
[trench live &amp; let live stuff]
</p>
<p id="tournament_10">
Anyway -- and the winner is...
</p>

<p id="the_winner_is">
(drumroll please...) &rarr;
</p>

<p id="tournament_winner_1">
<b class="tft">COPYCAT!</b>
</p>
<p id="tournament_winner_2_yay">
Congrats, you placed your bet on the right horse.
</p>
<p id="tournament_winner_2_nay">
(Sorry, [CHAR].)
</p>
<p id="tournament_winner_3">
<span class="tft">Copycat</span> goes by many names.
The Golden Rule, reciprocal altruism, tit for tat, or... <b>live and let live.</b>
That's why "peace" could emerge in the trenches of World War I:
when you're forced to play the same game with the
same <i>specific people</i> (not just the same generic "enemy") over and over again --
<span class="tft">Copycat</span> doesn't just win the battle, it wins the war.
<br><br>
But if things change a lot when you play multiple rounds of the same game, what if we play...
</p>
<p id="tournament_teaser">
...multiple <i>tournaments?</i> &rarr;
</p>


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<!-- - - - - EVOLUTION! - - - - - - -->
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<p id="evolution_intro">
Now, let's let our population of players <i>evolve over time</i>. It's a 3-step dance:
</p>
<p id="evolution_intro_1">
<b>1. PLAY A TOURNAMENT</b><br>
Let them all play against each other, and tally up their scores.
</p>
<p id="evolution_intro_2">
<b>2. ELIMINATE LOSERS</b><br>
Get rid of the 5 worst players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them)
</p>
<p id="evolution_intro_3">
<b>3. REPRODUCE WINNERS</b><br>
Clone the 5 best players. (if there's a tie, pick randomly between them)
</p>
<p id="evolution_intro_footer">
...and REPEAT, for as long as you'd like.
Note: you don't have to wait for people to literally die &amp; reproduce for culture to evolve --
all that's needed is that "unsuccessful" behaviors go away, and "successful" behaviors are imitated.
So now...
</p>
<p id="evolution_intro_button">
...let's see this in action. &rarr;
</p>

<p id="evo_1">
Say we start with the following population of players:
<span class="all_c">15 Always Cooperates</span>,
<span class="all_d">5 Always Cheats</span>, and
<span class="tft">5 Copycats</span>.
(We'll ignore <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> &amp; <span class="prober">Detective</span> for now)
<br><br>
We're going to do the tournament-eliminate-reproduce dance a dozen times or so.
Let's make another bet! Who do you think will win the <i>first</i> tournament?
</p>

<p id="evo_2_all_c">
Makes sense, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> outnumbers everyone else right now...
</p>
<p id="evo_2_all_d">
Makes sense, <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> has a lot of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> to exploit...
</p>
<p id="evo_2_tft">
Makes sense, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> won the tournament last time, why not again?...
</p>
<p id="evo_2">
Let's see if you're correct:
</p>

<p id="label_play_tournament">
1) play tournament
</p>
<p id="label_eliminate_bottom_5">
2) eliminate bottom 5
</p>
<p id="label_reproduce_top_5">
3) reproduce top 5
</p>

<p id="evo_3_all_c">
Alas, <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span> got eaten up by
<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>, whose numbers have now increased by 5.
</p>
<p id="evo_3_all_d">
Sadly, you were correct! The <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> won this time, 
and their numbers increased by 5.
</p>
<p id="evo_3_tft">
Alas, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> did not win – but at least they didn't do as bad
as <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>, who got eaten up by <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>,
whose numbers have now increased by 5.
</p>
<p id="evo_3">
But let's try a few more rounds of this...
</p>

<p id="evo_4">
<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> is still growing,
at the expense of <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>...
</p>

<p id="evo_5">
And now, all the <span class="all_c">Always Cooperates</span> are dead.
But, wait...
</p>

<p id="evo_6">
That's right: the <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> became a victim of their own success!
They exploited the naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span>,
but once they ran out of them, they had to face the <span class="tft">Copycats</span>:
who <i>are</i> nice, but not naive.
</p>

<!-- TODO: Freeman-Dyson???? -->
<!-- TODO: (other strategies will be introduced later) -->

<p id="evo_7">
By simply copying the other player's moves,
<span class="tft">Copycats</span> can play nice with each other,
while <span class="all_d">Always Cheats</span> just cheat themselves.
Not only that, but it also means <span class="tft">Copycat</span>
can give <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>
a taste of their own medicine.
</p>

<p id="evo_8">
And so, as a result...
</p>

<p id="evo_9">
...<span class="tft">Copycat</span> inherits the earth.
</p>
<p id="evo_9_all_c">
So, although your bet was off -- the nice-but-naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperaters</span>
were doomed from the start -- in the end, a <i>smart</i> form of niceness prevailed,
and the <span class="all_d">Always Cheaters</span> were squashed.
</p>
<p id="evo_9_all_d">
So, in the short run you were right - <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> won the first few rounds,
but in the end, its exploitativeness was its downfall.
</p>
<p id="evo_9_tft">
So, in the long run, you were right - <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins!
<span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span> may have won in the short run,
but its exploitativeness was its downfall.
</p>
<p id="evo_9_end">
This reminds me of a quote:
<br><br>
<i>"We are punished by our sins, not for them."</i><br>
~ Elbert Hubbard
</p>
<p id="evo_9_btn">
(oh, and by the way...)
</p>

<p id="evo_10">
(...this result is similar even if we put
<span class="grudge">Grudger</span> &amp; <span class="prober">Detective</span> back in:)
</p>

<p id="evo_autoplay">
start the evolution process!
</p>
<p id="evo_autoplay_stop">
stop the evolution process
</p>

<!-- More reference to game theory earlier? -->
<!-- TODO: More "me" and "I"??? -->

<p id="evo_10_followup">
(Note: occasionally, a few <span class="grudge">Grudgers</span> may stick around,
because when all players except <span class="grudge">Grudger</span> &amp; <span class="tft">Copycat</span> 
are eliminated, the two tie.)
<br><br>
So, it seems the math of game theory is telling us something:
that <span class="tft">Copycat's</span> philosophy,
"Do unto others as you would have them do unto you", may be not just a 
<i>moral</i> truth, but also a <i>mathematical</i> truth.
However...
</p>
<p id="evo_10_btn">
...there's a problem: &rarr;
</p>

<p id="evo_11">
There are jerks. Look around.
<br><br>
If <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is the strategy in this repeated game of trust that's so powerful --
that even soldiers in World War I trenches independently "evolved" a similar strategy, called "live and let live" -- 
why, then, are there so many un-trusting, un-trustworthy people?
What's causing our epidemic of un-trust?
<br><br>
A clue's in that sentence itself. "In <i>this</i> repeated game of trust."
So far we've only talked about change in the players:
what about <i>a change in the game?</i>
What could lead to...
</p>
<p id="evo_11_btn">
...the evolution of <i>distrust?</i>
</p>

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<!-- - - - - - DISTRUST - - - - - - -->
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<p id="distrust_1">
Before everything goes to heck: let's start with something nice.
A world, mostly populated by nice <span class="tft">Copycats</span>,
with only one each of a
mean <span class="all_d">Always Cheat</span>,
naive <span class="all_c">Always Cooperate</span>,
unforgiving <span class="grudge">Grudger</span>, and
manipulative <span class="prober">Detective</span>.
<br><br>
Use the buttons on the right to <b>start</b> the simulation,
go through it <b>step-by-step</b>, or <b>restart</b> it. &rarr;
</p>

<p id="distrust_2">
Under our current rules, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> wins easily.
<br><br>
But that's under our <i>current</i> rules, which say that
players play against each other 10 rounds per match.
What if players had to play 20 rounds? 5 rounds? 3 rounds? 1 round?
Use the slider below to change this rule, <b>start</b> the simulation,
and see what happens – then repeat this for as many numbers as you'd like to experiment with:
</p>

<p id="distrust_2_end">
(when you're done, press:)
</p>

<p id="distrust_3">
As you just saw, if you play enough rounds, <span class="tft">Copycat</span> still wins...
but when people play with each other less and less... suddenly, // HOW MUCH?
<span class="all_d">ALWAYS CHEAT</span> dominates once again.
<br><br>
In 1985, when Americans were asked how many close friends they had,
the most common answer was "three". In 2004, the most common answer was <i>"zero"</i>.
Furthermore, we're also (relatively) less likely to
get married, volunteer, go to church, join organizations, or participate in local politics.
We're losing our "social capital".
And as you discovered for yourself just now,
<b>the fewer "repeat interactions" there are, the more distrust will spread.</b>
<br><br>
(and no, mass media doesn't count:
it has to be repeat <i>two-way</i> interactions between <i>specific individuals</i>.)
</p>
<p id="distrust_3_btn">
oh, it gets worse... &rarr;
</p>

<p id="distrust_4">
There's another way to breed distrust.
Here are the "payoffs" for a single round of the trust game:
</p>
<p id="distrust_4_end">
Note: although the reward for mutual trust (+2) is less than the temptation to exploit (+3),
with enough repeat interaction, trust can still win!
But now, <b>click the arrows above to change the reward from +2 to +1,
then click "start".</b>
Even though +1 is still more than the punishment for mutual distrust (0)...
what happens?
<br><br>
(<i>after</i> you try that, feel free to play around with different "payoff" combinations!
once you're done experimenting, hit:)
</p>
<p id="distrust_4_note">
(simulating: 5 rounds per match)
</p>

<p id="distrust_5">
So even if the reward for getting a "win-win" is still <i>more</i>
than the punishment for a "lose-lose"...
<b>if the reward for mutual trust is <i>too</i> low, distrust evolves.</b>
<br><br>
I think, as a culture, we're losing the value of finding "win-wins".
We're more interested in "win-lose", because viciousness gets views, conflict gets clicks.
We'd rather live and let die.
Maybe I'm just overthinking things, maybe I'm just old and shaking my fist at a cloud...
but don't you feel it? That we've forgotten something?...
</p>
<p id="distrust_5_btn">
...whatevs i dunno &rarr;
</p>

<p id="distrust_6">
Aaaaanyway, you can now play with both the number of rounds <i>and</i> the payoffs!
These two things interact with each other a lot.
For example, even though a low +1 reward creates distrust with 5 rounds per match,
trust can still win with <i>10</i> rounds per match! (Click <b>START</b> to simulate this)
</p>
<p id="distrust_6_end">
Once you're done experimenting,
(and there'll be a <i>much</i> bigger "sandbox" to play around with at the end)
let's take a look at our final, most interesting barrier to trust...
</p>
<p id="distrust_6_btn">
<strikethrough>Misteaks</strikethrough> Mistakes. &rarr;
</p>

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<!-- - - - - - NOISE! - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="noise_1">
As cool as <span class="tft">Copycat</span> is, it has a huge, fatal weakness I haven't mentioned yet.
To understand it, let's imagine two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> are playing against each other:
</p>
<p id="noise_1_end">
Being a nice player, both their first moves will be:
</p>

<p id="noise_2">
And normally, they'd just pay back each others' kindness and sing Kumbaya 'til the end of days.
</p>
<p id="noise_2_end">
But what if, while trying to reciprocate...
</p>

<p id="noise_3">
<b>OH NO</b>
<br>
Mistakes, miscommunication, misinterpretations -- accidents happen all the time in real life.
</p>
<p id="noise_3_end">
But if the other person doesn't <i>think</i> it was an accident...
</p>

<p id="noise_4">
<b>OH NO x2</b>
<br>
The other player, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span>, <i>had<i> to retaliate...
</p>
<p id="noise_4_end">
...and you, being a <span class="tft">Copycat</span> as well, will <i>also</i> have to retaliate...
</p>

<p id="noise_5">
And like the Hatfields and McCoys, or the Crips and Bloods,
these two <span class="tft">Copycats</span> will spiral into an endless feud of vengeance...
</p>
<p id="noise_5_end">
...that started over a <i>single</i> mistake, long forgotten.
<br><br>
How tragic. But now, are there other characters, types of players, who can...
</p>
<p id="noise_5_btn">
...survive mistakes? &rarr;
</p>

<p id="noise_characters">
Let's meet some new faces!
</p>

<p id="character_tf2t">
<b>COPYKITTEN:</b>
Hello! I'm like <span class="tft">Copycat</span>,
except I Cheat back only after you Cheat me twice in a row.
After all, the first one could be a mistake! Purrrrr
</p>

<p id="character_pavlov">
<b>SIMPLETON:</b>
hi i try start cooperate. (unless i make mistake) 
if you cooperate back => good thing => i do same thing as last move. (even if it was mistake)
if you cheat back => bad thing => i do opposite thing as last move. (even if it was mistake)
</p>

<p id="character_random">
<b>RANDOM:</b>
<i>Monkey robot! Ninja pizza tacos! lol i'm so random</i>
(Just plays Cheat or Cooperate randomly with a 50/50 chance)
</p>

<p id="noise_characters_end">
Alright, let's see how well these peeps do when they...
</p>
<p id="noise_characters_btn">
...play against each other &rarr;
</p>

<!-- fixed 5% chance: winner simpleton, then copykitten -->
<!-- Need to simulate first to write words, i dunno -->

<!-- (Recap distrust) nonlinear barrier: from 0% to 5% to etc etc... -->

<!-- MIS-COMMUNICATION & OVER-PUNISHMENT in real life -->

<!-- How's this all interact? Finally, the SANDBOX. -->


<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - SANDBOX! - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="sandbox_population">
Start off with this distribution of players:
</p>

<p id="sandbox_payoffs">
The payoffs in a one-on-one game are:
</p>
<p id="sandbox_reset_payoffs">
reset payoffs
</p>

<!--
When translating the following, keep the "[N]", with square brackets,
as a placeholder for the number. Some of these need double-translations,
one for the plural version, one for the singular version.
-->

<p id="sandbox_rules_1">
Play [N] rounds per one-on-one game
</p>
<p id="sandbox_rules_1_single">
Play [N] round per one-on-one game
</p>

<p id="sandbox_rules_2">
After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] players &amp; reproduce the top [N] players
</p>
<p id="sandbox_rules_2_single">
After each tournament, eliminate the bottom [N] player &amp; reproduce the top [N] player
</p>

<p id="sandbox_rules_3">
In each round of a one-on-one game, there's a [N]% chance a player makes a mistake
</p>

<p id="sandbox_end">
...once you're done playing around, let's recap
</p>
<p id="sandbox_end_btn">
what we've learnt &rarr;
</p>



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<!-- - - - - CONCLUSION! - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="conclusion_1">

TRUST:
- repeated interaction: 
- win-win: 
- dealing with mistakes: forgive, and try to be clear and honest yourself

DISTRUST:
- loss of social capital
- win-lose, use versus them, zero-sum
- gleefully punishing even small mistakes

But above all, there's also...
</p>
<p id="conclusion_btn">
...the bigger lesson &rarr;
</p>

<p id="conclusion_2">
Don't hate the player, hate the game.
<br> 
Game theory lesson.
<br> 
Short term: game changes players. But don't be cynical
<br> 
Long term: players change game, from the bottom up -- evolution.
<br> 
So if we wanna cure our epidemic of distrust,
and rebuild a trusting &amp; trustworthy civic society, it's up to all of <i>us.</i>
Let's all learn and act to find win-wins, 
to create repeated interactions,
(and...)
</p>

<p id="conclusion_2">
...to live and let live.
<!-- the christmas truce pic/photo(?) circular pic... words overlaid -->
</p>

<p id="conclusion_button">
&lt;3
</p>

<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - CREDITS! - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->


<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - FEETNOTES - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->


<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - THE PLAYERS - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="label_tft">Copycat</p>
<p id="label_short_tft">
copycat
</p>
<p id="icon_tft">
<span class="tft">
	<span class="icon"></span>
	<span class="icon_label">Copycat</span>
</span>
</p>

<p id="label_all_d">Always Cheat</p>
<p id="label_short_all_d">
cheater
</p>
<p id="icon_all_d">
<span class="all_d">
	<span class="icon"></span>
	<span class="icon_label">All Cheat</span>
</span>
</p>

<p id="label_all_c">Always Cooperate</p>
<p id="label_short_all_c">
cooperater
</p>
<p id="icon_all_c">
<span class="all_c">
	<span class="icon"></span>
	<span class="icon_label">All Cooperate</span>
</span>
</p>

<p id="label_grudge">Grudger</p>
<p id="label_short_grudge">
grudger
</p>
<p id="icon_grudge">
<span class="grudge">
	<span class="icon"></span>
	<span class="icon_label">Grudger</span>
</span>
</p>

<p id="label_prober">Detective</p>
<p id="label_short_prober">
detective
</p>
<p id="icon_prober">
<span class="prober">
	<span class="icon"></span>
	<span class="icon_label">Detective</span>
</span>
</p>

<p id="label_tf2t">
Copykitten
</p>
<p id="label_short_tf2t">
copykitten
</p>

<p id="label_pavlov">
Simpleton
</p>
<p id="label_short_pavlov">
simpleton
</p>

<p id="label_random">
Lol So Random
</p>
<p id="label_short_random">
random
</p>


<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - SMALL LABELS! - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="label_cooperate">
cooperate
</p>

<p id="label_cheat">
cheat
</p>

<p id="label_play">
play
</p>

<p id="label_stop">
stop
</p>

<p id="label_step">
step
</p>

<p id="label_reset">
reset
</p>

<p id="label_population">
population
</p>

<p id="label_payoffs">
payoffs
</p>

<p id="label_rules">
rules
</p>

<p id="label_next">
next &rarr;
</p>


<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->
<!-- - - - NAVIGATING CHAPTERS - - - -->
<!-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -->

<p id="chapter_intro">
0. Introduction
</p>
<p id="chapter_oneoff">
1. One Game
</p>
<p id="chapter_iterated">
2. Repeated Game
</p>
<p id="chapter_tournament">
3. One Tournament
</p>
<p id="chapter_evolution">
4. Repeated Tournament
</p>
<p id="chapter_distrust">
5. The Evolution of Distrust
</p>
<p id="chapter_noise">
6. Making Mistaeks
</p>
<p id="chapter_sandbox">
7. Sandbox Mode
</p>
<p id="chapter_conclusion">
8. Conclusion
</p>
<p id="chapter_credits">
9. Credits
</p>